




Faculty or Humanities, Social Science, and Education – Centre for Peace Studies 
Vietnam – A general study of the triangulation toward change: social 
movements, economic development, and political changeover 
An overview on the Vietnamese political development between internal movements and 
external constraints 
Fornaroli Alessandro 





First, a special thanks to my supervisor Professor Marc Lanteigne for the helpful advice 
through the process of writing this thesis. I am also indebted to all the staff of the Center for 
Peace Studies at University of Tromsø. What I achieved there is beyond a standard academic 
education; I found a more important principle: sharing knowledge without being competitive, 
because everyone has their own bit of important experience to share. This, I think, is the real 
sense of a community.  
 
A special thanks to the entire community of Tromsø, which has created a special international 
place on a tiny spot of the map of the stunning country of Norway. Here I received the 
opportunity to become friends with very special people through the master’s programme. 
 
And, last but not least, a very special thanks to my family, who support me in every life 
choice. Every form of freedom should not be taken for granted, so I express my appreciation 






ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CBOs Community-Based Organizations 
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam 
VUAL Vietnam Union of Art and Literature 
VUFO Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations 
VGCL Vietnam General Confederation of Labour 
VNA Vietnamese National Assembly 
VNASC Vietnam National Assembly Standing Committee 
VNGOs Vietnamese non-Governmental Organizations 









Table of Contents 
Abstract 6 
Foreword 7 
1 Introduction 11 
1.1 Literature gap 12 
1.2 Research questions 13 
1.3 Limitations 16 
1.4 Relevance for peace research 17 
1.5 Dissertation outline 18 
2 Conceptual framework 19 
2.1 Premise to the definitions of middle class and civil society 19 
2.2 Definition of middle class 20 
      2.2.1 Middle class in the Vietnamese case 21 
2.3 General academic conceptualization of civil society 23 
      2.3.1 Contextualization of the associational life in Vietnam 24 
      2.3.2 Structure of the Vietnamese organizational system 25 
      2.3.3 Application of the concept 26 
2.4 Polyarchy - Brief introduction to the concept 29 
2.4.1 Polyarchy – Political institutions 30 
2.5 Democracy and polyarchy – Reason for adopting the concept 32 
2.6 Modernization theory – General definition 33 
2.6.1 Critics to the modernization theory 34 
2.7 Summary 38 
3 Literature review 39 
3.1 Class distinction and political leanings 39 
3.2 Constitutional revisions and rule of law 41 




4.1 Case study design 42 
4.2 Theory and research 43 
4.3 Method – Qualitative analysis of the literature 44 
4.4 Premise to the theoretical framework  45 
4.5 Comparing different approaches 47 
4.6 Theoretical framework – Middle range theory 48 
4.7 Group selection and elaboration of data 49 
4.8 Self-reflexivity 50 
4.9 Summary 51       
5 Contextual framework — Vietnamese relation with China 52 
5.1 Historical roots – ethnic resistance from Chinese assimilation 56 
5.2 Political similarities with China – curb to social and political change 56 
5.3 The South China Sea dispute 57 
5.4 Summary 59 
6 Impact of single-Party elections — Opportunity to formulate preferences 60 
6.1 “Democracy” in Vietnam  60 
6.2 Impact of single-Party elections and legislatures for democratization  62 
6.3 Opportunity to formulate preferences 64 
6.3.1 Freedom to form and join organizations 64 
6.3.2 Freedom of expression  66 
6.3.3 Right of political leaders to compete for support 67 
6.4 Summary 73 
7 Why Vietnam is not a full polyarchy — Some political predictions 74 
7.1 Pluralism and Polyarchy 74 
7.2 Mobilizing and complementary role of civil society 76 














Vietnam - a general study of the triangulation toward change: social movements, 
economic development, and political changeover 
 
The 1986 Economic Reform (Doi Moi) can be considered a watershed in Vietnamese history. 
The resulting development has also had a notable impact on society, where a more solid 
economic base has enabled the development of the middle class, a necessary condition for the 
growth of civil society. While the political system still defends a collectivist model, economic 
liberalism is bringing the Vietnamese people closer to a growing form of individualism. 
 
This thesis aims to study the political change taking place in Vietnam. The analysis was based 
on a thorough systematic review, including the main articles and data on the topic. The 
analytic perspective adopted was that of polyarchy, which acted as a lens subsequently used 
to answer two questions. First: What are the points of contact between economic 
development, political liberalization, and civil society? And second: What political factors 
lead to the consideration of Vietnam as a polyarchy? 
 
Finally, through a consideration of the internal and external contexts in which the country is 
situated, the thesis proposes a partial re-evaluation of the Vietnamese one-party model, 
making proposals for future trends in civil society and government behaviour. 
 
Keywords: Vietnam, Human Rights, Economic Development, Doi Moi, Civil Society, 






This brief foreword is intended to clarify the aims of the thesis and the ideas the author 
has about the main concepts employed in the dissertation. 
The original idea was to study the eventual role Vietnamese civil society might have 
in the transition from an authoritarian to a more liberal, democratic regime. All these concepts 
would then have been embedded together in a triangulation where, at every corner, a mutual 
reinforcement mechanism between the presence of a more autonomous civil society, strong 
economic development (after the Đổi Mới reform) and marked political reforms could be 
expected to be found. The study was thus intended to test the supposed increase in 
independence that Vietnamese civil society has gained in the last decades, thus further 
complicating its relationship with the government. However, due to various limitations and an 
initial bias in the analysis, the research was difficult to carry out and needed a refinement in 
the focus of analysis as well as in the research questions themselves. In fact, initial knowledge 
on the topic was biased due to a misconception of the term “democracy” and the democratic 
process itself. Amongst the different theoretical approaches to democratization, 
modernization theory initially got credit for its smooth inferences. However, this revealed 
itself not to be the case in general, nor for Vietnam in particular. Specifically, a thorough 
analysis of the concept of democracy has revealed how a Western idea of the term would have 
affected all the design of the original project, from the formulation of its research questions to 
the elaboration of the data. The following clarification is intended to avoid in the reader the 
common misinterpretation of democracy as: 
1) The best and most representative form of government; the most equal 
and just system for every citizen; the inevitable and ideal final stage that every regime 
should aim for; and, 
2) The political process that is intrinsically associated with a marked 
economic development. 
The first point is inherently related to the second. The assumption that high levels of 
socioeconomic development favor the transformation of a hegemonic regime into a polyarchy 
favors a misleading association between socioeconomic level and “political development” 
(Dahl 1971, Chapter 5). This assumption spread after the economistic triumph in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, when a general trend of research tended to highlight how 




toward a democratic model, and how such a level of development necessarily birthed 
democracy.  
As the scholar Dahl (1971) showed in his seminal book, this linear equation is too 
simplistic and does not take into account several variables. First of all, as the author explains, 
modernization theory hardly accounts for a multitude of deviant cases: for example, it 
disregards both democratically oriented countries under the minimum required threshold 
considered to bolster democracy, and those undemocratic countries above such per capita 
income level. Further, it is not possible to assume such a relationship as unidirectional. So, 
critics of this theory affirm that data gathered so far does not sustain with any degree of 
certainty the hypothesis that a high level of socioeconomic development is either a necessary 
or sufficient condition for what is generally meant for democracy, nor the converse hypothesis 
that competitive politics is either a necessary or sufficient condition for a high level of 
socioeconomic development (Dahl 1971, p. 71). Further, it is hardly possible to establish a 
causal relation between democracy and socioeconomic level since it is nearly impossible to 
define what an “advanced economy” makes possible by its performance and what it requires 
for its performance. In fact, there are some variables that were generally considered as merely 
a genuine consequence of a democratic transition, whereas they could be rather seen as a 
necessary condition for it.1 For instance, a more sustained form of economy requires a more 
educated labor force, hence an average higher level of education and, in turn, a reduction of 
illiteracy. So, if an educated population could be seen as a common trend of democratic 
countries, it would be equally true that an advanced market needs a more specialized labor 
force in other political regimes as well. 
Such a problem was addressed by another prominent scholar, Giovanni Sartori (2008), 
who underlined how it is true that a democracy with a weak market is a politically poor one, 
but the opposite is not always the case: there are several examples of “nondemocratic” 
countries with a strong internal and external market. In fact, as China is seeking to prove on 
 
1 These aspects are best rationalized in Dahl’s book (1971) and essentially regard the level of 
development, the degree of equality and inequality for different variables, governmental 
effectiveness, internal cleavages, and the state’s capacity to exercise foreign control. As it is 
said before, these variables are merely considered as a consequence of the democratic system 
by those who adhere to the Modernization Theory. Other scholars, as Dahl for instance, point 
out how it is difficult to infer a causal relation between the kind of regime and the above 
variables. Hence, without a clear causal relation, it is not clear what aspect comes first in the 
causation. Hence, it is commonly thought that an interaction, or synergy between both aspects 




the Eastern stage, a market economy may even exist and flourish without (or, alternatively, 
preceding) a democracy. This, for instance, was also the case in Singapore, Taiwan, and 
South Korea pre-democratic transition. Further, in other contexts, the adoption of the 
democratic system can be counterproductive—as it was in Latin America, where an import 
substitution and a protectionist policy, along with a “deficit” market model, lifted 
consumption levels above those of both domestic production and citizens’ earnings. 
The conclusion to this premise may thus be understood such that this thesis totally 
abandons the idea that democracy is the preferred and most efficient political model. What is 
important for a well-functioning system is not the implementation of the “democratic 
package” with Western features, but rather only the adoption of the elements that best fit the 
history of a given country. Leaving aside the democratic discourse, it is hence possible to 
assess the performance of various states according to some common elements. One of the 
elements that has been found to positively impact the economy, for instance, is the closeness 
of the political apparatus to its citizens. The opposite also holds true: when a detachment to 
the State, culture, or party affiliation occurs, the economy is going to suffer for several 
reasons. It is in this respect that some scholars explain the current crisis of countries that are 
traditionally regarded as democratic—by showing the elites are now detached from their 
surrounding socioeconomic environment. Their identification is no longer with their fellow 
citizens, but toward other upper-class members around the world: they have risen to a global 
dimension, bolstering this kind of economy and forgetting the actual needs of the people 
(Lasch, 1995). On the other hand, non-democratic countries such as Vietnam may present a 
tighter relationship between citizens and the Party. This is because, historically, there have 
been mediating figures between the central government and the normal citizen, à la the 
Chinese bureaucratic model that was present in the North. This, in turn, allowed a widespread 
diffusion of the state apparatus in the country and a greater responsiveness of the government 
to the people’s needs and problems with an effective feedback system. In the same Vietnam 
for instance, the difference in the economic performance between the North and South can be 
justified by looking at the pre-socialist tradition as well as cold-war era politics, where the 
northern Dai Viet region adopted a Chinese bureaucratic model, and the southern Khmer 
region a Cambodian one. The first model was based on the village council, elected by popular 
male suffrage, which coordinated taxation, public goods provision, conscription, and record-
keeping. In the Khmer model, the village council was not present and, as in India, a patron-




the peasantry and the local administrative personnel in the North, which facilitated not only 
the relationship with the central government, but the economy as well.  
To conclude, there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the claim that democracy is the 
“best” model nor that it is conducive to better market performance. Alternative regimes offer 
a great deal in this sense, with deviant cases that sometimes outperform democratic countries 
under certain variables. It is hence more convenient to talk about polyarchy instead of 
democracy, thus avoiding the dichotomous polarization between what is democratic and what 
is not. An honest classification should present a vast array of variables and degrees to which a 
country could be classified, and the concept of polyarchy, as explained in later chapters, best 






The idea behind this thesis comes from a personal and academic interest in the 
Southeast Asian Region in general, and the nexus between civil society engagement, political 
change, and economic development in particular. For the reasons presented in the following 
paragraphs, Vietnam has been chosen as a case study. I chose to focus my analysis on this 
country because it has recently emerged as a key player in Southeast Asia and, along with 
other factors, it would be very current and appropriate to make a contribution in this sense. 
Strategically located at the heart of the Asia–Pacific region, Vietnam is home to a population 
of 88 million people and a promising economy that has registered an average annual growth 
rate of around 7% over the past decade. Since adopting the “Doi Moi” (renovation) policy in 
the late 1980s, Vietnam has also been pursuing an active and constructive foreign policy 
aimed at diversifying and multilateralising its external relations. Vietnam’s quest for deeper 
international economic integration and a greater political role has therefore brought the 
international community an opportunity to engage the once-pariah state in building a 
peaceful, stable, and prosperous regional order (Le Hiep, 2012). This brought Vietnam to 
make a transition from a rigidly orthodox Marxist-Leninist state and intransigent member of 
“the socialist camp” in a sharply divided Cold War international system, to deep engagement 
with globalization in a world no longer clearly divided into friends and enemies.  
Vietnam is ranked 84th of 192 countries for political stability, raising the question as 
to whether it is currently at risk of political instability (The Global Economy, 2020). As such, 
the leadership in Vietnam has been challenged by social, political, economic, and 
environmental turmoil in recent years. Its Party-state has underestimated a series of social 
unrest incidents, such as anti-China protests and other demonstrations related to increasing 
social tension on land compensation, resettlement, environment pollution, and 
industrialization (Bui, 2014). These have placed the government in the position where 
strategic actions must be taken soon in response to the public’s claims for interrelated human 
rights, including the right to know (in the anti-China protests), the right to information, and 
the right to health (in environmental unrests) (Tuong, 2014). Internal instability and the ever-
growing presence of Vietnam on the international stage have contributed to leading the Party-
state to new thinking and values in governance. This change in politics found space in the 
building process of the socialist law-based state: in this stage, there has been a “gradual 
spread of human rights discourse into political, social and legal spheres from which it was 




1.1 Literature Gap 
After a brief literature review, several thematic clusters related to Vietnam’s political 
and economic development in the last decades were identified: articles about the Doi Moi 
economic strategy adopted in 1986, the debates leading up to and following constitutional 
reviews (mainly in 1992 and 2013), and civil society’s engagement for more human rights. 
However, there is a great gap in the analysis that civil society actors played during these 
processes. Both economic and political research has only been explained from the state point 
of view, without taking into account the problems and needs it faced in relation with its 
society. Considering that political, social, and economic aspects of Vietnam are now also 
individually well-known in English academic literature, the need to study the linkages 
between these angles has become more evident.2  
The new study framework I propose is a triangulation between economic reforms, 
political development, and the role of civil society. A preliminary definition of civil society 
may be “the realm of autonomous and active associations which bridge the gap between 
individuals and political institutions of representation”. Because it would be impossible, and 
analytically erroneous, to find and study a causal relation between the request of more rights 
from civil society and governmental action, it is worth analyzing whether and where a 
positive interaction can be found. Rights on property, for instance, have been granted in 
Vietnam upon civil society’s request (Vu & Kien, 2016), and the State has also recognised the 
need to endorse the new private market sector (Nørlund, 2006). These examples show how 
the process towards a more civil libertarian state is not a one-way process, but rather, the 
result of a synergy between different factors. The lacuna I wish to fill will develop from an 
analysis of civil society’s aims, the needs behind their requests, and their forms of 
organization. With the addition of civil society to the analysis, there is an erosion of the 
state’s image: it is no longer represented as a socialist organization that grants rights “from 
the top downwards”, but rather is depicted as the framework within which civil society acts 
 
2 For the economic aspect, see: Edwards, V., & Phan, A. (2014). Managers and Management 
in Vietnam: 25 Years of Economic Renovation (Doi Moi). London: Routledge. For the 
development of the middle class: Marshall, V. N., & Al. (2014). Reinvention of Distinction: 
Modernity and the Middle Class in Urban Vietnam. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Lastly, for 
the social reforms: Taylor. (n.d.). Social Inequality in Vietnam & the Challenges to Reform. 





and expresses itself. This new role is also more suitable with the transition from a 
collectivistic view of human rights—with its predominance over individual ones—to the 
embedding of national jurisdiction within an international, more universalistic conception of 
such rights. As this explanation implies, the hypothesis of this research does not consider the 
middle class, or civil society, as the necessary precondition for a state's development in a 
liberal direction. Nor can we say that, without this societal category, we would have had the 
same results.  
Due to the extreme environmental complexity that marks modern organizations and 
the interconnections between their parts, every change at every state level is potentially 
affected and conditioned by other components. The economic theory of the “open door”, for 
instance, would not have found implementation without the entrance of Vietnam into the 
international capitalist market and an internal middle class capable of sustaining local 
industries and demands (King, 2008). The admission to the international stage, in turn, 
required a minimum level of rights provisions and an adjustment to international law (Vu, 
2016). Given this introduction, I can now present the research question of this thesis. 
1.2 Research Questions 
The basic idea behind the project is to analyze the economic and social development 
of Vietnam during the last forty years. This could be done through looking at how 
Vietnamese society has affected state policy in general—in particular, through the lens of 
pluralism. As it will be further explained in the next paragraphs, attention will be given to 
civic associations, with a particular focus on VNGOs.3 Starting from the literature on the 
topic, the thesis analyses the interaction between government, VNGOs, and economic 
developments in the country. 
The basic assumption at the foundation of this research is that, during the last few 
decades, a solid middle class arose in Vietnam. This is the result of a series of economic 
reforms the country embarked on: maneuvers which improved both development and living 
standards (King, 2008; Gainsborough, 2002). Despite the concepts of middle class and civil 
society indicating two different spheres of society, it is generally demonstrable that the former 
presupposes the latter. The definition and relation between these two concepts will be 
explored in more detail in the next chapters, but it might be preliminarily said that “middle 
 




class” may be defined using economic or social indicators. Economic indicators are usually 
the most common formulas and regard measures concerning the distance from the median, the 
range of the distribution, the distance from the poverty line, and purchasing power (Reeves et 
al., 2018). It must be clarified, however, that since 1990, Vietnam has explicitly allowed the 
development of civil society, including via the emergence of non-governmental organizations 
(Hsiao, 2018; Bui, 2013).  
Depending on the theoretical lens one adopts, civil society may be deemed a state-
policy challenging actor, a promoter of social reforms, or a partial supporter of the 
authoritarian rulership.4 As a result, it may be seen as the main driver toward either 
democracy or a different polyarchical regime, or as a supporter of the political system in 
power (Wischermann 2013, 2018). If civil society is conceived as a driver toward democracy, 
modernization theory is an applicable theoretical approach in this sense. It assumes that 
modernization is a social movement where society starts a process of transformation from a 
“traditional” to a “modern” form. This transition brings changes to three interrelated levels: 
economy, politics, and social structure. Regarding the political level, modern governmental 
systems in this condition should display a higher level of differentiation and functional 
specialization, adopting a rational procedure in decision making. As societies modernize, the 
centralized bureaucratic systems and political powers start founding themselves on law rather 
than on power. The political system is thus expected to become more open, leading to an 
increase in democratic consciousness among the people (Cao, 2009). At first glance, Vietnam 
seems to put the theory of modernization in practice with its recent and significant 
development. However, the general aim of this thesis is to study where Vietnam’s 
modernization is going. This thesis does not adopt the classic modernization theory but a 
polyarchical approach instead. This is due to two main aspects: Modernization Theory has 
proven itself not only to be biased, but also to be an inferior tool of investigation when 
compared to polyarchical thinking. As it will be better clarified later in Chapter 2, 
modernization theory exaggerates the importance of socioeconomic levels. Historically, this is 
because economic data has generally been more available compared to those related to 
objective or subjective inequalities (Dahl 2007, Chapter 8). It is equally true that “only the 
 
4 The adjective “partial” is intended to say that it is not possible to reason in a binary way. Thus, 
it would be unjust to label civil society as entirely devoted to promoting human rights or to 
supporting the party system. In every society, there are some sectors which behave differently 




most fragmentary comparative information is available on the beliefs of political activists in 
various countries, particularly in countries with hegemonic regimes” (Dahl 2007, p. 206). So, 
many countries were classified as democracies just because of the availability of economic 
indicators compared to countries elsewhere. The difference between modernization theory 
and a polyarchical approach is also due to their respective conceptions of democracy itself. As 
a short premise, it is worth defining the notion. In basic terms, every system that shows to be 
completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens and is characterized for public 
contestation and inclusiveness may be labelled as a “democracy”. However, where 
modernization theory conceives of the democratic system as the final step every regime 
should aspire to, polyarchy researchers believe democracy simply represents one end of the 
scale of political systems. In these terms, democracy is just a hypothetical system that “serves 
as a basis for estimating the degree to which various systems approach this theoretical limit” 
(Dahl 2007, p. 2). So, polyarchical thinking relies on several social indicators to classify the 
democratic level in a certain country. However, at this point, it suffices to say that the main 
difference between the two approaches is on how democracy is conceived per se (the most 
common political system vs. a hypothetical stance) and in relation to the specific case study 
(the most desirable form of government vs. one kind of government). Using a modernization 
approach, only those indicators that are most representative for, or more common in, a 
democratic system would be analysed. However, both the literature and the current state of 
affairs of Vietnam suggest that civic organizations are not carrying out democratic reforms, 
nor are there strong movements for this transition (Wischermann 2003, 2018). Instead, 
evidence is consistent with the classical theory of polyarchy. 
The research questions of this project are so intended to contribute to analyzing this 
phenomenon. The aim is to look at why a democratic transition in Vietnam is not going to 
occur in the general terms by which the concept is generally conceived. A preliminary answer 
is noticeable in the particular economic reforms Vietnam embarked on, as well as the distinct 
nature of NGOs and their relationship with the government. To understand the importance of 
civil society and civic organization in the Vietnamese path toward pluralism, it is better to 
come back again to the concept of democracy itself. The definition of democracy is not 
unitary and may be applied to different social spheres. In its most common terms, it has two 
primary conceptualizations. As aforementioned, democracy is a kind of government based on 
elections and civil liberties. In this realm, we find classification in procedural democracy, 
liberal democracy, and polyarchy. In a more sociological sense, democracy is also conceived 




another or living at the expense of others” (Kerkvliet 2014, p. 427). Labels for this taxonomy 
include substantive democracy, broad democracy, and non-liberal democracy. With these 
considerations in mind, it should be easier to understand how civic organizations help the 
analysis to understand what accounts for this gap between the past or present system and a 
pluralistic order under a more sociological definition of the term. In fact, if every political 
status quo is maintained and reinforced through the diffusion of ideologies, doctrines, and 
beliefs, then civil society may help to change the political course. Sometimes, in fact,  
the likelihood [of] […] democracy developing often depends in part on the extent to 
which groups, associations, organizations and other social interactions can form, 
thrive, and become alternative sources of ideas, information, and inspiration to what 
regime authorities and organizations provide and promote (Kerkvliet 2014, p. 429).  
With these concepts and the theoretical framework that is presented, the research questions that 
guided the research are formulated as follows: 
1. What are the points of contact between economic development, political 
liberalization, and civil society?  
2. What political factors lead to the consideration of Vietnam as a  
polyarchy? 
1.3 Limitations  
This project presents two main limitations due to the chosen method of investigation, 
i.e., qualitative analysis of the literature. As a first point of discussion, it may be said that the 
“reuse of qualitative data may be hindered by the secondary analyst’s lack of an insider’s 
understanding of the social context within which the data were produced” (Bryman 2012, p. 
586). The lack of the insider’s understanding is here amplified by two other intertwined 
factors: the distance from the state under analysis, and the lack of knowledge of the 
Vietnamese language. The other point is that a research implementation with a survey or an 
interview may have added the actor’s perspective to the analysis—in this case, an 
interrogation of civil society. So, on one hand, secondary data analysis has the advantage to 
elaborate on all the unexplored material from the large and unwieldy sets of data that are 
generated by quantitative researchers. On the other hand, however, a mixed method may have 
helped to more deeply explore the research questions. In this particular case, for instance, a 
questionnaire may have helped to bypass many official representations of the Vietnamese 




questions. Another related aspect is that much significant information is withheld by the 
Vietnamese government or local authorities.  
A suggestion for future research on the topic may be to directly interview civic 
associations, thus avoiding the public restraint to share sensitive information. With the focus 
on civic organizations, it may be possible to study political change in an indirect way, hence 
looking at the kind of relationship between such organizations and the local government. The 
quality of the relationships, and thus the different degrees of conflict that are registered, may 
suggest how the government is dealing with the different and specific topics that are brought 
forward by the associations in question. Possible questions could be around what kind of 
relationships exist between them and the governmental apparatus, what kind of decision-
making model is present at a state level, and whether it is replicated in those same civic 
organizations, etc. Further, it may be interesting to analyze which content and which content 
factors provide for the democratic or authoritarian (or a mixture of both) structures, practices, 
and attitudes (within different types of associations)—and, in case, why and how various 
types of associations strive for the survival of the authoritarian regime. 
1.4 Relevance for Peace Research 
To conclude, it is worth underlining the relevance of the topic to war and peace 
studies. It is interesting how Vietnam emerged from a period of extended conflict with great 
powers within a short period of time, and how this country managed the balance between 
economic growth and stability. In fact, despite its difficult geographical position when 
confronted with its proximity to China, it managed to develop whilst avoiding developmental 
weakness. In this regard, Doi Moi has also been advanced as a tool to promote both national 
well-being and regime security. Because of that, Vietnam’s strategic policy, under the 
leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), has been subject to conflicting 
interests, especially instances in which a policy may be favorable for national well-being but 
harmful for regime security, or vice versa.  
For example, deeper international economic integration and further market 
liberalization are likely to bring Vietnam greater prosperity, but they have also alarmed a 
number of CPV conservatives who see them as threats that might cause the country to deviate 
from the socialist path or undermine the party’s rule. (Le Hiep, 2012) 
What is interesting regarding Vietnam as a case study is that it was able to start a 
peace and societal process simultaneously. To do so, Doi Moi reform played a major role. On 




active civil society. This drastic change of the economic paradigm served to ensure that the 
country’s economy would grow to the point where a stronger compact could be forged 
between the government and the citizenry. In order to maintain its legitimacy, in fact, the 
government and the Party have been urged to pay attention to people’s needs: access to public 
services, information, and opportunity to improve their lives. This discourse is especially true 
for the middle class, which is developing its sense of class unity and identity and using it to 
advance demands to the Party (Revilla, 2016). On the other hand, the state managed social 
movements in a war-to-peace transition context. Its contrast with the US before, and with 
China later, led the state to find internal unity and external independence in order to manage a 
hostile external environment.  
1.5 Dissertation outline 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to this thesis, briefly outlined the context around 
which the research questions fit and presented some hypotheses as well. The chapter also 
discussed limitations of this thesis and explained the relevance for peace research. 
Chapter 2 provides a general academic conceptualization of key concepts such as those of 
“civil society”, the “middle class”, and “polyarchy”. The chapter further explores the main 
theories and approaches on the argument, e.g., the domains-based approach, the structural-
functional approach, and the actors-centred approach. 
Chapter 3 is the background and literature review chapter, where the main articles on the 
topic are discussed. Here the research is divided into thematic clusters, among them those 
regarding Vietnamese class distinction and political leanings, as well as constitutional 
revisions and rule of law. 
Chapter 4 provides an explanation and justification of the employed methods and 
methodological framework for this research. Hypotheses are also presented here. 
Chapter 5 constitutes the second part of the study. Here the focus is on the geopolitical 
framework around Vietnam. In particular, the difficulty to combine internal socio-economic 
reforms with external problems, such as those with China, is explained.  
Chapter 6 constitutes the main corpus of the thesis, where findings are discussed in relation 
with the hypotheses of the project. This chapter explores how Vietnam, contrary to the 
assumptions of modernization theory, is not going to adopt a democratic model but a 
polyarchical framework instead. The chapter also presents final comments by briefly 
connecting the situation of the case after the timeframe of the research. 




2 Conceptual framework  
 
This chapter is intended to explain and justify the main concepts around which the 
thesis is developed. The discussion can be seen as divided into two parts, where the first is 
devoted to the specification of the subject, i.e., civil society, and the second gives an overview 
of the concepts of democracy, modernization theory, and polyarchy. 
In the premise of the opening part, a parallel between the notions of middle class and 
civil society is provided. This comparison hopes to clarify the differences between the two 
concepts and which societal aspect they are focused on. A general definition of middle class is 
then followed with what is considered to be middle class in the Vietnamese case. At this 
point, the idea of civil society with a general overview about the organizational system in 
Vietnam is introduced. Then, the analysis is directed to who the actors of the inquiry are and 
how they differ from other entities. 
 In the second part, the concept of democracy is better explained in order to understand 
two related elements: polyarchy and modernization theory. Both approaches are defined 
separately and then confronted. The chapter concludes by clarifying why polyarchy is 
considered to be a better tool to investigate the Vietnamese case study rather than the more 
simplistic concept of democracy. 
2.1 Premise to the definitions of middle class and civil society 
Before going further with the definition of middle class, it is important to specify why 
this concept needs to be outlined, comparing it to that of civil society and looking at what 
points they have in common. First of all, it must be said that there is no agreement over the 
general definition of middle class and civil society. Both notions vary according to the scope 
of the research, and whether they are analysed in relation with the state, with other classes, 
according to their level of income (See appendix 2), credentials, culture, etc. Thus, it is hardly 
possible to give a clear-cut distinction between middle class and civil society. What is 
important to stress preliminarily, is that they are strongly intertwined for the same conditions 
they are favoured by (e.g., economic development), and for their intentions. However, the 
concept of middle class is generally employed when an economic division of societal strata is 
suitable for the scope of the analysis; civil society, on the other hand, inherently brings with it 
an attitude generally characterized by activism in favour of political change or for the benefit 




Due to the space limit and the focus of the thesis, only a general explanation of 
“middle class” will be given. However, it is worth saying that the three main categories by 
which middle class may be commonly defined are (Reeves, 2018)5:  
1. Cash: economic resources, income, wealth, freedom from poverty  
2. Credentials: educational achievements and qualifications, occupational status  
3. Culture: attitudes, mindset, behaviour, self-definition 
In the kaleidoscope of definitions of the middle class, each approach tries to answer specific 
questions from a certain angle. Whereas occupational status or education may be emphasized 
by sociologists, philosophers and anthropologists tend to analyze broader concepts of culture, 
education, power, social behaviours, etc. On the pragmatic side, economists use definitions 
and formulas related to wealth, income, and level of expenditure. So, distinguishing between 
different specializations, it is possible to identify different clusters of questions which, in turn, 
lead to different diagnoses of trends, reforms, and challenges—which each specialization 
ultimately tries to make predictions about. 
2.2 Definition of middle class 
The most common connotation that the middle class assumes in political analysis, 
especially in studies about democratization processes, is as the main economic driver, the 
major booster for the domestic market, as well as the source of an economic take-off in 
developing states (Diez, 2016). However, the middle class is itself the result of a process of 
economic development and is strongly dependent on the market economy. In fact, what is 
generally considered as an “advanced economy” both makes possible the growth of such a 
class by its performance and requires it for its performance. In fact,  
an advanced economy not only can afford but also requires the reduction of illiteracy, 
the spread of universal education, widespread opportunities for higher education, and 
a proliferation of means of communication. Not only can it afford to produce an 
educated labor force, but it needs one: […] engineers, technicians, scientists, 
accountants, lawyers, managers of all kinds. (Dahl 2007, p. 76)  
This feature may be indicated by several aspects, e.g., the level of average daily consumption 
per capita, which is clearly higher for certain echelons of the population (World Bank, 2016). 
 
5 Once the middle class is defined according to pre-established criteria, it is important to fit it 
into the context of analysis. It should be important to consider it in relation to the state and 




For some scholars such as Moore (2010) and Lipset (1963), however, the middle class has an 
ambiguous role in the process of democratization, because it might have interests that collide 
with governmental efforts for democratization. However, this interpretation of history is at 
odds with the modernization theory which found its basis in Weber and Pearson’s thought and 
generally argues that there is a direct link between civil society and economic development.6  
2.2.1 Middle class in the Vietnamese case 
In the Vietnamese language, the concept of middle class is quite uncommon or barely 
publicly expressed. In its place, however, and due to the economic turnover that has marked 
Vietnam since 1986 with the new Doi Moi policy (Đổi Mới), an emergent class has been defined 
as the “new rich class” (Nhà giàu mới nổi), or as the “wealthy upper class” (Giới thượng lưu) 
(King 2008, p. 73). Both definitions are comprised in the broader expression of middle level 
(âng ló’p trung liêu). So, it is interesting how the marker here is immediately based on 
disposable income and economic power, and not primarily on social prestige. In a society where 
there has been a compression of the traditional middle class under the Communist Party of 
Vietnam, and thus a state with a bipolar division between the working class and the elite class 
(with the latter closely tied with the Party), the country’s opening up to the global dimension 
via the Doi Moi allowed the rise of a new class made up of private entrepreneurs (Bélanger et 
al. 2014, pp. 1-15). It must be considered also that this is not only a Vietnamese situation but a 
leitmotif in the history of several Southeast Asian countries with a socialist past (Hsiao, 2018).  
As briefly introduced in the premise, the composition of the middle stratum has 
changed during the implementation of Doi Moi policies; this led to the rise of new actors due 
to the space allowed by the new market economy. In fact, before Doi Moi, the term 
administrative middle class was used to label that part of society with a certain income, 
privileges, and social prestige in a way between the political elite and the ordinary people 
(Heberer 2003, p. 63). Also, it is possible to include in the milieu designated by the term all 
the people gravitating towards the Party: people that, due to their functions, were supported 
by each regime and were provided with material privileges, such as scientists, artists, writers, 
 
6 See, for instance: S. N. Eisenstadt, 1966, Modernization: Protest and Change, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.; Ali A. Mazrui, 1968, 'From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of 
Modernization. A Tradition of Analysis', World Politics, Vol. 21, No. I.; J. P. Nettl and Roland 
Robertson, 1968, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies. The Formation of 




model workers, war veterans, etc.7 With the economic turning point of 1986, a process of 
social re-stratification began: entrepreneurs and the self-employed of all kinds started to be 
associated with this group. Mainly as a spontaneous result from the social policies of the 
1980s, these new social groups have been firstly recognized, then tolerated and endorsed by 
the Party-state. As expressed by the scholar Bui: “In that context, various forms of ‘civil 
society’ exist and perform a role which the CPV finds useful for societal control alongside 
other types of organization, particularly the mass organizations,” and “[The] Vietnamese 
Party-state has employed both a cooptation strategy and a Gramscian concession to maintain 
its existing hegemony over popular ideas, values, and norms in governance” (Bui 2013, p.2). 
In this point of view, civil society is performing the typical role of Leninist institutions: 
“mobilizational instruments of the authorities by transmitting official policies and laws to 
society” (Stromseth, 2013).  
It is important to note that this ongoing process of stratification does not allow a 
unified, organized class with class consciousness. For this and other reasons, many scholars 
prefer talking about strata and not class, which is a less flexible and more closed indicator 
(King, 2008). Also, depending on the parameters one decides to use for the grouping process, 
the membership to one group or the other may be variable. For instance, in both China and 
Vietnam, the new group of entrepreneurs do, in terms of income, and so too in economic 
prestige, fluctuate on a scale between upper-middle and top-level incomes. However, the 
same category has no political influence, it is not still socially recognized. Hence, in terms of 
social estimation, this stratum should be put in the lower-middle part of the scale. A great 
schema of changing class interests under Doi Moi is given by Gainsborough, who divides 
Vietnamese society into five classes (Gainsborough 2002, pp. 697-702): 
1. Large Landowners  
2. The Peasantry and Rural Workers  
3. The Urban Working Class  
4. The Bourgeoisie  
5. The Salaried and Middle Class  
This latter category is defined by the author as:  
 
7 I.e., individuals who functioned in the Party’s decision to open the Vietnamese market to the 




Professional state employees holding positions of responsibility in the bureaucracy 
and state enterprises, although there is likely to be some overlap with the capital-
owning classes or bourgeoisie. A rather newer group in this category would be 
professional Vietnamese employed by foreign companies. […] some scholars were 
emphasizing an emerging gulf between groups such as this and the state, arguing that 
people were increasingly organizing their lives without reference to the party. 
(Gainsborough 2002, p. 710) 
2.2.1.1 Difference between middle class and middle stratum. The concept of 
“class” in Vietnam is problematic. Social (economic) stratification is quite a new 
phenomenon in post-reform Vietnam, and it used to avoid a linguistic heritage of class as 
associated with the colonial and postcolonial eras. In pre-revolutionary terms, “petty 
bourgeoisie” (tiểu tư sản) was used to appeal to educated urban professionals (lawyers, 
teachers, doctors) who did not necessarily espouse values associated with middle classes. So, 
society is preferably divided into strata, since most Vietnamese consider the concept of class 
as a categorization in occupational terms (Earl, 2014). Similarly, the concept of “middle 
level” (trung bình, indicating an average household income) is ambiguous and, still, it does 
not embrace the ensemble of values that are usually associated with a certain educational 
attainment or occupational status. Research has shown how the two concepts of “middle 
class” and “middle level” do not overlap, but instead form a matrix. One could be judged a 
middle class member in terms of income, but a working class member according to 
occupational criteria (Nguyen-Vo, 2008, as cited in Earl, 2014, p.22). It may also be possible 
that the government itself avoids directly mentioning the “middle class”, using the anodyne 
term “middle stratum” since “class” has considerable political baggage. As it is better 
explained above, scholars bypass this situation by focusing on social practices, income levels, 
occupation, education level, political power and social networks.  
2.3 General academic conceptualization of civil society 
The year 1990 marked a turning point in the analysis of the relation between the state, 
its organizations, and civil society. Whereas modernization theorists of the 1960s and the 
subsequent generations that followed (like neo-Marxist and neoliberal thinkers) focused on 
the state and on the forces behind its aspiration to make progress, the new political trend in 
the 1990s turned its attention to what is generally defined as “political culture” (Hyden 1997, 
pp. 3-4). This expression detaches itself from structuralists theories because, in the 




it recognizes that human choices are mediated by state or market institutions. This shift in 
analysis was derived from the acknowledgement that the state alone, in particular democracy 
as a form of government, could not lead to durable economic growth. By the 1980s, the idea 
of the state thus shifted from what has been defined as a “rational instrument” to an 
“instrument of exploitation”, bringing attention to local communities and institutions. It is in 
this framework that civil society is recognized for its role as the supplier of the state’s lack of 
organization. As the scholar Goran Hyden declared: “Democracy requires organization, 
organization requires an interest in public affairs” (Hyden 1997, pp. 3-4). In this respect and 
for the functions it has been given, civil society is defined as: “a sphere of social interaction 
between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the 
family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements and 
forms of public communication” (Cohen & Arato, 1994, as cited in Powell, 2007, p. 2). In 
other terms, civil society is “that part of society that connects individual citizens with the 
public realm and the state. Put in other words, civil society is the political side of society” 
(Hyden 1997, p. 5). However, other scholars such as Hasenfeld and Gidron go beyond this, 
stating that civil society does not pursue only a political goal, but it is also divisible into three 
dimensions:  
First, there are apolitical civil society organizations such as social clubs and self-help 
organizations. Second, there are civil society organizations that have explicitly 
political goals of either a transformative or reforming nature that includes various 
local and national social movement organizations such as civil rights, anti-abortion or 
anti-globalisation. Third, there are civil society organizations that legitimate and 
reinforce state regimes and policies through their programs and activities, for example, 
voluntary hospitals and social service agencies. (Powell 2007, p.3) 
2.3.1 Contextualization of the associational life in Vietnam 
For the last 20 years, the rapid expansion of civil society may be seen as linked to the 
renovated economy and the diversification of employment, business, and communications. As 
per the reduction of government restrictions in the 1980s, voluntary organizations and 
associations now comprise “mutual assistance groups, marketing networks, consumer groups, 
sports teams, charity organizations temple and church fellowship, disabled people’s 
associations and health and fitness groups” among others (Kerkvliet 2018, p. 433). However, 
in this broad realm, it is important to note that only a small part has engaged in direct 




with, not confrontation against, the political system” (Kerkvliet 2018, p. 434). That is, 
engagement refers to every form of interaction where particular interests are advanced along 
with moderate reform proposals. This process occurs in a framework where there are 
advantages both for associations and for the political process as a whole. However, there are 
some civic groups such as the Việt Tân which hope that their engagement, along with 
economic development, is going to bring about what is called “bourgeois democracy”. In 
Marxist terms, these groups are those whose operative principle is protecting the state and the 
bourgeois order, and everything is subordinated to that objective. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to define what organizations and associations constitute 
civil society. A great starting point to have a more thorough idea of civil society’s role in 
Vietnam, its values, its impact, and the environment where it grew is given by the scholar 
Irene Nørlund (see Appendix 1). Despite her (now) outdated data, her analyses remain 
applicable. In her view, civil society is defined as “the arena outside the family, the state and 
the market where people associate to advance common interests. An arena that is wider than 
just the sum of a particular set of organisations and associations” (Nørlund 2006, p. 33). 
Further, it is also possible to define the social civic sector as  
[...] The field where collective efforts, social movements, activities of civic 
organisations and social networks take place. This is also the field where non-
profitable activities, policy advocacy, welfare and charity activities are seen. The civil 
sector may target economic, educational, healthcare, welfare and sporting activities. 
This sector is an entity that rallies the collective efforts of organisations, movements 
and networks. It is a component of the greater social system. (Nørlund 2006, p. 124) 
2.3.2 Structure of the Vietnamese Organizational System 
The structure of the Vietnamese Organizational System could be seen as a hierarchical 
pyramid (see table 1) where, since the first National Congress of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam in 1935, the greatest role has been played by mass organizations. These 
organizations are the main tool at the apex that keep the central government responsive to the 
population, thanks to an extensive and widespread net of such organizations at every level of 
the society. The coordination of this broad apparatus is held by the Vietnam Fatherland 
Front, a political coalition directly led by the Communist Party of Vietnam. This institution 
represents the political base of the people’s administration, and its main task is to “materialize 
the Party’s guidelines and policies, strictly abide by the Constitution and laws, supervise the 




employees” (No. 14/1999/QH10). The Fatherland Front, in practice, takes form in what are 
officially labelled as Socio-Political Organizations which comprise the Women’s Union, the 
Farmer’s Association, the Youth Organization, the War Veterans Association, and the 
Worker’s Organization. Each of these organizations counts several million members and they 
still have a strong grip among the population. At this level, there are also three main umbrella 
organizations under which other organizations are affiliated. Among these umbrella bodies, 
three organizations are particularly important: the Vietnam Union of Scientific and 
Technological Associations (VUSTA), the Vietnam Union of Art and Literature (VUAL) and 
the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations (VUFO). These branches may be seen as a 
bridge between the central government and other Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). 
Each of them, in fact, counts several member associations and, in affiliation with other similar 
associations, they give structure to the Socio-Professional Organizations body which, in turn, 
is conducive to Party-state control. Getting closer to the bottom of the pyramid, the situation 
is different for the VNGOs and other Social Organizations in general, whose relations with 
the state are no more linked to the Fatherland Front, but rather are mediated by the Provincial 
or other District People’s Committees. At the very bottom of the associational hierarchy, 
however, there are Community-Based Organizations, the scopes of which are only to 
coordinate activities within neighborhood groups and family clans. Due to their narrower 
realm of maneuver and power, most of them are not even registered as usually occurs in every 
state—nor is their relation to the state mediated by an indirect affiliation to other 
organizations. 
2.3.3 Application of the concept 
Taking into consideration the above definitions of civil society and the 
contextualization of Vietnamese organizations within the state apparatus, this section is 
intended to explain how these organizations differ from each other, and what kind of 
relationship they generally have with the state. Valuable observations for future 
research are also offered. These observations are the result of an intense analysis of the 
organizational work and represent what has not been included here due to time and 
resources limits. The classification of organization will be delegated to the method and 
methodology chapter: here, a general overview of the main characteristics and problems 
is offered. 
2.3.3.1 Relation between the state and civil society.  As it regards civil 




point in 1986, Vietnam’s priority was that of fostering middle class economic growth, 
while seeing civil society as a “necessary evil” to accomplish that. Its presence within 
Vietnamese society pre-dated the acceptance and recognition of the government. As a 
social force, in fact, civil society proved its presence even before the market-based 
reforms launched in 1986. As a theoretical concept, however, it has only recently been 
transplanted into the government's public political discourse (Bui, 2013). Since the late 
1980s, the emergence of civil society has been noted as a new and particular 
phenomenon characterizing state-society relations in a mono-Party and authoritarian 
state dominated by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). Although the central 
government has always been highly reserved concerning political reforms, as it is better 
described above, economic reforms have been correlated with visible social changes. 
Among these changes, was a process of relaxation of controls toward civil society. The 
space that created a restoration of this class is due to the symbiosis of a traditional 
Marxist-Leninist structure and a market economy. (Bui, 2013). In other words, a more 
liberal form of the market required a society able to sustain economic growth. This led 
civil society through a transition from the status of totally ruled by the state-Party, to 
that of “tolerated”, “endorsed”, and then finally recognized by it. It serves for the state 
to fill a gap, playing a role both in the governance network and in national development. 
In practice, the state recognized its presence while still looking at it with suspicion, thus 
accepting the dual challenge of piloting the market economy while handling civil 
society’s push to a political and social liberalization. In this sense, the CPV has found it 
useful to use the various forms of which civil society exists for societal control; for 
example, by organizing it into specific organizations (Bui, 2013). Nevertheless, with 
time, civil society gained more space and autonomy, having now the potential to run 
beyond the government’s control and its capillary control.8  
2.3.3.2 Structure of the organizations. Regarding the nature of the 
organizations, it is worth saying that their aims and relationship with the administrative 
apparatus depend on the city in which they are located. In fact, some studies have 
shown how regional contextual factors affect the way these agencies behave with the 
government. It is possible to affirm that, in general, the relationship between civic and 
 
8 This process is similar to the “political liberalization” described later in Chapter 6. Once a 
certain phenomenon is politically approved and socially recognized, it is difficult for the 




governmental organizations is more relaxed in the South than in the North. In the 
evaluation about the presence of problems in dealing with the authorities, northern 
organizations have declared higher percentages of difficulties than southern ones 
(Wischermann 2010, 2011). This means that conclusions should take into account the 
various kinds of specific and region-related contextual factors, such as closeness to 
other umbrella organizations or the government. Further, even if the overall trend 
depicts a more tense situation in Hanoi, the quality of the relationship also depends on 
the specific kind of organization as well. In this regard, Mass Organizations present an 
overall high level of conflict with the Socio-Political Organizations they are affiliated 
with. This tension is derived from the additional tasks these organizations have been 
given in these last two decades, whilst still enjoying the same limited status by the 
Party-state. Nevertheless, NGOs and Business Organizations are the ones that display 
the most problems with the central authority. NGOs for instance, are in the same 
position as Mass Organizations, i.e., providing services that the state does not render 
any longer. However, unlike the latter, they must rely on Government-funded 
programs—thus complicating their position. Business Organizations, on the other hand, 
reported friction with Governmental Organizations seeing as their financial 
independence characterizes them as potential competitors to important Party-led 
economic, social and political plans (Wischermann 2010, 2011). 
 With this basic understanding of the relationship between Civic and 
Governmental Organizations, it is evident how it is desirable to include associations 
closer to the Party-state apparatus and others more representative of the ground level, 
the aims of which center on accomplishing everyday needs. Also, it would be important 
to include Research Institutes and Scientific and Technology Organizations because of 
their status as quasi-governmental organizations, since they receive financial support 
from the state, “at times functioning as part of the bureaucracy while at other times 
carrying out independent policy research and advocacy” (Taylor et Al., 2012). On the 
other hand, NGOs and Volunteer Groups were included in the table as they represent 
the best way to understand the process of normalization in the relationship between 
Civic and Governmental Organizations. This is because the growing number of 
NGOs—and, to a lesser extent CBOs, Volunteer Groups and Social Enterprises as 
well—is a testament to the wider array of ways society has started to express its 
requests, needs and opinions; this advancement brings a stark contrast to the state 




surprising then that the interaction between the two realms is producing more conflicts 
nowadays than before, when the relationships between them were considered as more 
“easy” (Wischermann, 2010). 
 In sum, in this thesis any organization is considered, a priori, as a civil or non-
civil association. It would be nearly impossible as a foreign researcher to make a clear-
cut taxonomy with a top-down approach. A valuable point for future research may be to 
directly ask civil society actors whether or not, and to what degree, they consider 
themselves and the organizations they represent as an active part of civil society. 
Firstly, giving the word to the members of such organizations would allow us to bypass 
the exclusion of those associations which may not be classified as “civil” but whose 
contributions to the social life of the country should be recognized and documented. 
Secondly, in accordance with the results, it would be possible to trace inferences about 
the two patterns: between those who classify themselves as civic actors and declare to 
know the general meaning and implications that the term civil society has, and those     
who do not display such recognition.  
Table 1 




Scientific and Technology Organizations 
NGO 




2.4 Polyarchy – Brief introduction to the concept 
The word “polyarchy” identifies processes and institutions of the kind of 
representative democracy that spread in the 20th century. The word gained success when it 
was affirmed in the vocabulary of political science by Robert A. Dahl (2007) and Charles E. 
Lindblom (1977). What makes polyarchy unique as a type of democracy is its political 
institutions, which distinguish it both from non-democratic regimes of every kind and from 




Republic during the Middle Age and Renaissance. Though some of its political institutions 
were adopted by many countries during the 19th century, only New Zealand adopted 
universal suffrage before the 20th century. 
2.4.1 Polyarchy – Political institutions 
At a very general level, polyarchy can be defined as a political order characterized by 
two general characteristics: citizenship is extended to the majority of adult members of the 
community, and citizenship rights include the opportunity to oppose the holders of the highest 
offices of government. These constitute the two axioms around which Dahl developed his 
research and are thus distillable to: inclusiveness and public opposition. The first of these 
characteristics differentiates polyarchy from more exclusive systems of government in which, 
although opposition is allowed, governments and their legal oppositions are restricted to a 
small group, as was the case for example in Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and other countries 
before universal suffrage was introduced. The second characteristic differentiates polyarchy 
from regimes in which citizenship, although extended to the majority of adult members of the 
community, does not include the right to oppose the government; this is the case in all modern 
authoritarian regimes (Dahl 2007, chapter 1). 
By better specifying these two general characteristics, polyarchy can thus be defined, 
in its ideal form, as an order characterized by the presence of eight political institutions (See 
Appendix 3). Using such a scale of indicators, we can compare and list different regimes 
according to their inclusiveness and public contestation. The above-mentioned guarantees are 
the following: 
1. Elective representations: control over the government's political decisions is 
constitutionally entrusted to representative bodies chosen by the electoral body. 
2. Free and fair elections: Elective representations are designated through elections 
conducted periodically and fairly, where coercion is relatively rare. 
3. Universal suffrage: the right to vote is recognized practically to all citizens who 
have reached the age of majority.9 
 
9 As we mentioned earlier, universal suffrage typical of polyarchies was only introduced in the 
twentieth century. Even in countries that had adopted other institutions of polyarchy, women 
were almost always denied the right to vote; it was, in fact, a question of male polyarchies. It 
must be said, however, that even in the latter a series of restrictions based on race, wealth or 




4. Right to compete for public offices and positions (passive electoral right): 
practically all adult citizens have the right to stand for elective government offices, 
although the age limits set for eligibility may be higher than those established for 
suffrage. 
5. Freedom of expression: citizens have the right to express their opinion, without 
incurring serious sanctions, on political issues in a broad sense; they therefore have 
the right to criticize the parliament, the government, the regime, the socio-economic 
order, the dominant ideology. 
6. Alternative information: Citizens have the right to seek alternative sources of 
information. There are also alternative sources of information that are not under the 
control of the government and enjoy the protection of the laws on freedom of 
expression. 
7. Right of association: In order to exercise their rights, including those mentioned 
above, citizens finally have the right to form relatively autonomous organizations or 
associations, including independent political parties and interest groups.  
These seven institutions ensure that governments follow certain fundamental procedures; 
consequently, polyarchy is sometimes referred to as procedural democracy.10 More 
importantly, polyarchies guarantee a very broad set of rights necessary for each of these 
institutions: in this sense, polyarchy is also a form of substantial democracy. It is important to 
emphasize that all these properties characterize real rights, institutions, and processes—not 
just nominal ones; as research has shown, these properties, with some simplification, can be 
specified in a sufficiently concrete way to allow an independent observer to classify most 
countries based on the actual presence of each of the institutions of the polyarchy. 
These classifications can be combined to provide a measure, or scale, of polyarchy: at 
one extreme there will be authoritarian forms of government, in which none of these 
institutions are present, at the other extreme, forms of government in which all are present; 
that is, the real polyarchies. Defining a polyarchy measure or scale can be useful for many 
purposes: among other things, it can serve to identify the conditions that generally favor or 
hinder the possibilities of development and stability of the polyarchy in a given country. 
 
10 For instance, this is the case of Kerkvliet, B. J. T. (2014). Democracy and Vietnam. In 





2.5 Democracy and polyarchy – Reason for adopting the concept 
According to the definition proposed above, polyarchy is therefore a specific form of 
government. However, it is also a form of democracy—probably the most important and 
certainly the most widespread form that democracy has assumed in the course of its long and 
discontinuous history in the field of political ideas and practices. In any case, polyarchy is the 
characteristic form that democracy took in the 20th century. Now it is worth asking what, then, 
is the relationship between polyarchy and democracy. Although many today, accustomed to 
the institutions of polyarchy, are inclined to establish an identity between polyarchy and 
democracy, there are good reasons for considering polyarchy not as the only form of 
democracy, but rather as simply one of the forms that democracy can take.  
One reason for adopting this view is that, even in the 20th century—and certainly in 
earlier eras—there were political systems which, despite the absence of some of the 
institutions of polyarchy, appeared to be just as “democratic” as polyarchies, if not more so. 
After all, the term “democracy” first appeared in classical antiquity to designate those systems 
of popular government that the Greeks introduced in many of their city-states, for example in 
Athens around 500 BC. However, we can therefore legitimately assume that “democracy” and 
“polyarchy” mean different things. Another reason why polyarchy should only be considered 
a historical form of democracy lies in the fact that we can very well imagine how a specific 
polyarchic government—that of Italy, say, or that of the US— could be more democratic than 
it currently is. In fact, what we call democratic governments are often criticized for being 
insufficiently so, or for violating democratic principles (Sartori, 2008). 
What these and other implicit conceptions of democracy seem to have in common is 
the idea of a group of people who govern themselves as politically equal; a self-governing 
demos; an association making collective decisions that its members are obliged to stick to; in 
other words, citizens who govern themselves through a democratic process. On the basis of 
this conception of democracy, what conditions will a political system have to satisfy in order 
to be considered fully democratic? Five appear to be the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a fully democratic government process between politically equal citizens. In simplified 
and formalized form, these conditions can be listed as follows (Sartori, 2008): 
1. Effective participation. 
2. Equality of vote. 
3. Opportunity for an adequate understanding. 




5. Extension of citizenship. 
Although these conditions can be specified in more detail, they nevertheless allow us to draw 
many important conclusions. In the first place, these are necessary conditions for a democratic 
process between politically equal citizens that is characterized as an ideal or as fully achieved. 
Second, almost certainly no political system has ever fully satisfied these conditions. Thirdly, 
consequently, all real democracies have remained far—often very far—     from the ideal 
democracy. Fourthly, however, at various times and in different places, certain political 
systems have come closer than others to achieving a process of democratic governance 
(Sartori, 2008). Historically, these systems have been called democracies (in some cases 
republics). Polyarchy is one such system. The seven institutions of the polyarchy 
aforementioned in Section 3.4.1 appear to be necessary, although not sufficient, conditions for 
a democratic government process to take place in large political systems such as a nation-
state. 
2.6 Modernization Theory – General definition11 
The contemporary social sciences make extensive use of the term “modernization” to 
indicate a process of large-scale change that brings a particular society—generally national— 
closer to the characteristics considered to be proper to modernity. The most significant aspects 
of modernity are identified at the economic level in industrial development, at the political 
level in the affirmation of democratic institutions, and at the cultural level in growing 
secularization, which is accompanied by an expansion of the freedom of choice of individuals 
in social relations. The use of the concept of modernization, which has established itself 
above all since the Second World War, has basically followed two distinct directions. The 
first focuses above all on the study of the origins and paths of modernization in Western 
societies: Marx, Durkheim, and Weber who, albeit in different forms, tried to grasp the 
distinctive features of modern society. However, the studies of the last few decades mainly 
belong to what could be called “comparative historical sociology of modernization”. The 
second direction followed by studies on modernization also asserted itself in the last post-war 
period, preceding the historical-comparative approach by a few years. The issue, in this case, 
is to analyze the characteristics of the “backward” countries and the problems they encounter 
in an attempt to get closer to the characteristics of a modernity typical of the more 
 




“developed” societies. At the basis of this line of studies, is the idea that Western modernity 
constitutes a challenge that inevitably pushes less developed societies on the path of social 
change. However, within this guideline, the approaches followed are very different (Inglehart 
& Welzel, 2009). 
Regarding the specific socio-political studies, this modernization theory has come to 
consider political democracy as the culmination of political development. Seymour M. Lipset 
(1959) found the existence of a close relationship between levels of socio-economic 
development and political democracy. Lipset's thesis was variously interpreted and criticized, 
also because it lent itself to a multiplicity of readings. At least three were possible, and were 
made: a causal reading, according to which socio-economic development produces political 
democracy; a probabilistic reading, according to which it is probable that, once certain levels 
of socio-economic development are acquired, political democracy will assert itself; a reading 
linked to the existence / survival of democracy, according to which, once achieved in any 
way, even by external imposition, political democracy has enormous possibilities of duration, 
especially if it is established in systems already developed from the point of socioeconomic 
view (Lipset, 1959). Przeworski and Limongi (1997), who are supporters of the latter 
interpretation, add another observation based on in-depth statistical research: “What 
destabilizes regimes are economic crises, and democracies, particularly poor democracies, are 
extremely vulnerable to poor economic performance” (Przeworski & Limongi 1997, p. 169). 
After having variously, but also vaguely, defined the goal of political development as the 
achievement of a stable and possibly democratic regime, scholars tried to understand how 
European political systems had developed and what lessons could be drawn from non-     
European examples (Sartori, 2008). However, due to space limitations, this is not the place to 
discuss such these last notions. 
2.6.1 Critiques of Modernization Theory 
The theory of modernization has been subjected to several and consistent criticisms 
since the late 1960s. We will consider them by analytically distinguishing some of the main 
assumptions of the theory on which they focus. However, it must be kept in mind that this 
operation inevitably involves some forcing as there is no well-defined theory of 
“modernization,” but rather a variety of approaches that are not always completely consistent 
with each other. 
2.6.1.1 Inevitability of development and ethnocentrism. As a first point, 




tendency to generalize starting from the Western experience. Modernization theorists are 
concerned, above all, with the optimistic idea of inevitable development. This idea is strongly 
criticized in the light of the concrete historical experiences of Third World countries which, 
having rapidly passed the phase of enthusiasm for the conquest of political independence, 
encounter strong difficulties from an economic point of view and are often hit by serious social 
and political challenges. Hence the conclusion that development is by no means guaranteed and 
that failures and blockages can occur in the process of modernization (Eisenstadt, 1973). 
However, the criticisms also regard the values of the theory of modernization: The same values 
are considered to be influenced by an “ethnocentric” vision which, in turn, leads to consider the 
Western experience not only as inevitable, but also as a positive model to which “backward” 
countries should adapt to improve the conditions of their societies (Bendix, 1967). 
2.6.1.2 Tradition and modernity as opposing models. A second element of the first 
studies on modernization concerned the conception of traditional and modern society as 
opposing models, made up of interdependent elements. Also in this case, the scarce historical-
empirical foundations led to an underestimation of the concrete diversity of traditional societies, 
whose image ended up being deductively reconstructed by contrast with the characteristics of 
modern Western societies. Criticisms attack both assumptions of this image (Bendix, 1967). 
First of all, the remarkable historical-empirical variety of traditional societies is 
emphasized; then, it is highlighted how cultural and structural elements, both traditional and 
modern, are present to varying degrees and in different combinations not only in the societies 
of non-industrialized countries, but in developed countries as well. For instance, family and 
parental ties or religious beliefs persist, albeit with different weight, in modern societies 
themselves. Conversely, values oriented towards achievement and entrepreneurship or 
bureaucratic structures that function according to universalistic criteria can also be found in 
traditional societies (Bendix, 1967; Tipps, 1973). Critics do not believe that, in a modern 
context, differentiation must necessarily proceed in all spheres. So, the change towards 
modernity of one of them would not necessarily entail the adaptation of the others according 
to a sequence already verified in Western societies. In short, a “selective modernity” can be 
developed, which concerns the means of communication or the demand for consumption or 
military structures, but which may not extend to the productive sphere or the functioning of 
political institutions, etc. Modernization processes of this type are frequent on the historical-





2.6.1.3 Economic conditioning and the dependency approach. Thus, we come to 
the third aspect: the idea that relations with the outside have a predominantly positive value 
for the countries that need to modernize, that is, that they act as a stimulus to the forces of 
change seen as essentially endogenous. In this point of view, contact with modern societies is 
a powerful solvent of traditional society, in the sense that it stimulates the modernization of 
cultural orientations and social structures, triggering mechanisms of irreversible change. On a 
more markedly economic level, this theory insists on the advantages that can come from 
technological diffusion and from international aid. But this approach overlooks the fact that 
the progressive insertion into the international market also entails constraints for economic 
development. It is more difficult than in the past to start an industrialization process: this is 
because, in order to compete with the industry of the more developed countries, a higher level 
of investment and a greater accumulation of capital is now required. On the other hand, 
backward countries typically specialize in producing raw materials and agricultural goods 
with low-skilled, low-priced labor. They end up exporting low-cost products that are 
exchanged for high-cost industrial products from developed countries. Therefore, the capital 
resources necessary for development are not formed, while competition from the already 
consolidated industries of other countries undermines less competitive artisanal activities 
(Cardoso e Faletto, 1969). 
2.6.1.4 Change as an endogenous evolution. Another series of interventions 
questioned the model of evolutionary change based on structural differentiation. The 
reference to this model is not present in equal measure in all approaches to the study of 
modernization, but only in some of them more specifically influenced by structural-
functionalism, according to which the key mechanism—which is valid for any type of 
society—is constituted by the process of structural differentiation. The thrust to establish 
more differentiated roles and social structures derives from the growing dissatisfaction with 
the functioning of a specific structure and, therefore, from a search for greater efficiency that 
takes the form of a higher functional specialization of the new structures that replace the 
previous one. Change is therefore seen as a process of adaptation of society, considered as a 
system of interdependent elements, to the physical and social environment. According to 
structural functionalists, it is possible to identify more or less evolved structural types, on the 
basis of the degree of structural differentiation and, therefore, of the ability to adapt to the 





We can distinguish two types of criticisms of these assumptions. The first remains 
substantially within the functionalist tradition but underlines how differentiation does not 
necessarily involve the expected increase in efficiency, because it can be accompanied by 
integration problems that determine phenomena of instability and lead to a subsequent arrest 
of modernization. The second order of criticism is more radical and involves the idea that it is 
possible, on the basis of past historical experiences, to establish an evolutionary sequence      
that may also be valid for the future. This idea is questioned because it presupposes a 
conception of society as a tendentially closed and coherent system, as an organism whose 
future state can be predicted on the basis of its structural characteristics at a given moment 
(Bendix, 1967). Instead, it is emphasized that change is not only an endogenous process of 
adaptation but is conditioned by the relationships between society and the external 
environment, an environment that constantly changes with historical development and which 
therefore places constraints and offers different opportunities. The stimuli that come from the 
external environment are not only positive, as the theorists of modernization claim, and they 
are not only negative, as the addictionist approach believes. The former does not take into 
account the fact that the external environment can lead to internal reactions in modernizing 
societies, which do not necessarily follow the experience of Western societies; the latter are 
attentive to the economic constraints that come from the international division of labor, but 
they lose sight of the endogenous factors (Bendix, 1967). 
2.6.1.5. Neoliberalism and the TINA stance. In the 1990s – early 2000s, the United 
States and United Kingdom were on the front line advancing the neoliberal model. This 
position got particular credit after the Soviet Union’s collapse and brought about what is 
referred to as American “triumphalism”. Margaret Thatcher legitimized and disclosed with 
the now famous expression, “there is no alternative” (TINA). However, the general optimism 
of this model started to wane when Argentina disconfirmed this model for the first time. 
These days, China is another great example of how economic growth may follow different 
paths. China is just the most notorious example of how development does not follow the 
liberal iron-clad law, nor does it confirm the idea that certain types of modernization and 
democracy inevitably follow economic development. Obviously, Vietnam is challenging that 
theory as well. According to Polanyi’s famous ‘double movement’: “while on the one hand 
markets spread all over the face of the globe...on the other hand a network of measures and 
policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market 





The theoretical framework adopted for this thesis is slightly different from the classic 
approaches that have markedly characterized the greater discussion on the topic. After a 
profound and thorough literary review, it has become evident how it would be too simplistic 
to study the changing political discourse in Vietnam with a “westernized” idea of democracy. 
The chapter is also intended to caution the reader about the correlation between economic 
development, political liberalization, and the growth of a civil society. Further, since Vietnam 
is hardly going to be a fully (ideal) “democracy”, it is hence impossible to identify causality 
between such three elements. So, their (cor)relation should be studied from a different point 
of view. 
To conclude, it is worth saying that the thesis differentiates itself on two points. The 
first is that it shows how modernization theory is flawed in the case of Vietnam. The second 
is that it is highly useful to look at the concept of “polyarchy” as opposed to “democracy” as 




3 Literary Review 
 
The articles I chose to present here are representative of the lack of attention regarding 
the role of civil society in several aspects of the state. The chapter is thus intended to 
introduce some strengths and weaknesses of the literature on the topic. After a solid 
theoretical basis, I chose to summarize here the main trend of questions behind most analyses. 
Research questions for future studies on the topic are then proposed.  
The literature is mainly divided into two thematic clusters, the first one devoted to 
class distinction and political leanings in Vietnam whereas, in the second half of the chapter, 
those articles on the rule of law and constitutional revisions are briefly analyzed. 
3.1 Class distinction and political leanings  
Regarding the sociological identification and definition of middle class in Vietnam, 
King’s The Middle Class in Southeast Asia (2008) and Professional Middle Class Youth in 
Post-reform Vietnam (2008) provide interesting insight. Finding such a definition that is 
specific to Vietnam has proven elusive. Most of the time, in fact, the Vietnamese “new rich 
category” is presented as a residual or subclass in the broader southeast scenario, and it is 
defined only through comparison with those present in other countries (Hsiao, 2019). Even in 
these articles mentioned, this social category is defined in materialistic terms of status, for the 
education and buying power that characterizes its members, or through the borders that 
differentiate it from other categories. However, the definition that the scholar tries to 
elaborate on depicts the middle class as a passive agent. These members are presented only 
through their differences with actors from other social categories and are not actively placed 
in relation to the state. In addition, for the reader the role of civil society is uncertain, and it is 
not clear whether the author conceives it as different from the concept of middle class or not. 
As we have seen, even if in the real context the distinction is far from being sharp; the two 
terms have different nuances and state different roles towards society. Again, middle class is 
basically understood as a stabilizing and moderating force that guards against authoritarian 
tendencies, while civil society is a force for the development of democracy and its 
maintenance (Kauffman, 2018). This distinction is useful for the aim of this thesis, which tries 
to depict more skilled workers as the main active actors in a liberal society, the main force 
behind the transition from a socialist state towards a new, more embedded model in the 
international environment.  




observation is the heterogeneous feature of the middle class. Thus, one should not look at it as 
one single liberal movement that pushes for a more democratic system, but as a fragmented 
group like every other social class. King describes this phenomenon as an opposition between 
a “well-educated, rational, democratically minded and generally liberal [middle class and a] 
security-oriented, anxiety-laden, state-dependent and generally conservative [one]” (King, 
2008). In a similar fashion, Hsiao (2018), analyzes this concept within Thai society. In his 
article, the author suggests that:  
This willingness of the middle class, activists, and civil society more generally to 
abandon basic democratic principles contradicts the ideal established in the literature. 
[…] It seems that only a greater recognition that civil society cannot be above politics, 
but must be fully engaged with politicians and the political process, which can lead to 
a better outcome. (Hsiao, 2019) 
Nonetheless, one should not see this dualism as an anomaly, since this is a characteristic 
present in every society. The interesting point here is to study what reasons and needs sustain 
the two parts in their struggle. A seminal contribution to this point was given by Moore’s 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2010), where the author explains how and 
why, in every society and in every time, there is always one conservative part which tends to 
defend its old privileges, and another one—more liberal—which asks the state to defend and 
sustain some sectors of the market.12 We should look at how this schema has been translated 
to Vietnamese society. More specifically, every study that takes account of this social 
fragmentation should be guided by these questions: How can we define and study the 
composition of the two ideologies (liberal and conservatives)? What are the interests they try 
to defend? What are the meanings to do so? What tools are more effective? The answer is 
always complex and not straightforward. In the Vietnamese case for instance, even if the 
evidence of a transition towards private sector employment may suggest a liberal advantage, 
the result is not obvious. Even in a time of rapid social and economic transformation a 
stagnant social ladder is apparent. In fact, there appears to be a strong continuity in 
employment and education between the current generation and its predecessors (King, 2008). 
 
 
12 The agrarian society is traditionally considered the most conservative one whilst that related 




3.2 Constitutional revisions and rule of law 
 Regarding constitutional revisions that marked Vietnam in these decades, seminal 
works include Thiem’s Deconstructing the “Socialist” rule of Law in Vietnam (2014) and 
Gian and Kien’s Constitutional Debate and Development on Human Rights in Vietnam 
(2016). Both articles are state-centric and attempt to explain how the Vietnamese state was 
able to embrace internationally recognized governance values within the doctrine of the 
socialist law-based state. Even if, until a certain period, the law was considered to represent 
the will of the ruling class, the authors devoted their analysis to what force brought the law to 
change in accordance with widely accepted international standards, subsequently giving the 
state more stability, transparency, accessibility, and constituency. The answer may likely be 
found in civil society. In this respect, two other sub-questions may be presented: What 
differences may we find between civil society and the elites? To what degree is civil society 
embedded in, or participates in, the decision-making process? In line with this research, there 
is now strong evidence of great commitment in human rights studies in Vietnam, through 
universities, government agencies and activist organizations (Vu, 2016). How can we 
combine this civil society’s commitment with a state characterized by a strong ruling party? 
And, more importantly: What are the factors and the elements that have thus far avoided a 
clash between government and civil society? How are tensions, if there are any, resolved and 
managed? The last two questions are fundamental to find and study all the elements that 
started a more or less pacifist transition, from a communist state towards a more liberal one 
(Dahl, 2010). These elements, and whether they will be found, could be a valuable tool for 
future research that might aim to find a correlation in other state settings or could be 
implemented in future pluralistic and peaceful transitions. I’m aware that this thesis is not 




4 Methodology and theoretical framework 
 
This chapter is intended to explain the ontological and epistemological perspectives 
that have guided, at different levels, the entire project—from the elaboration of the research 
questions to the interpretation of the data that were collected.  
Regarding the nature of the research, it can be considered as qualitative due to several 
factors alongside where I stand as a researcher and for the objective of the research (Bryman, 
2012). However, even if the project is qualitative in general terms, quantitative data were used 
to contextualize and support the theory on the topic and the research questions that motivated 
the analysis.  
The synergy between qualitative and quantitative approaches was conducive to both 
inductive and deductive reasoning. On one hand, the research began with deductive 
reasoning, since theories and previous research on the topic formed the knowledge where the 
research questions were defined. On the other, an inductive approach was evident in the 
design of the conceptual framework and in the construction of new general themes after data 
collection. 
This chapter is intended to explain this latest aspect, focusing on the research design 
and approach first, and reflecting upon the positionality and reflexivity as a researcher after. 
Throughout the same chapter, the limitations and challenges of the approach that has been 
chosen and how these were dealt with will be reflected upon. 
4.1 Case study design 
The basic idea of the study is to analyze how and in which terms Vietnam is changing 
at a political level. The peculiarity of this research is that political transition13 is mainly 
studied looking at political acts (of any sort) with a focus on the relationship between civic 
organizations and the government or other local, administrative authorities. This analysis, in 
 
13 I would like to let the reader linger on the subtle differences between the ideas of change and 
transition. I personally believe that, in the first case, the idea of “change” expresses a new 
situation with no immediate judgement or comparison of any sort to a previous condition. On 
the other hand, the concept of “transition” inherently brings with it the idea of shift from one 
point to another. Since, in the Western world, this movement usually has positive connotation—
for example a movement from a certain political or social condition to a better one—its 
uncritical adoption may be hazardous without contextualization. So, since I do not believe that 
democracy should be a better or the best form of government, I thus use the two terms 




turn, fits the definition of Yin (2003, p. 13), who describes the case study as “…an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Considering 
again all the above factors, this case study may be further defined as an instrumental case 
study, where “the case helps us understand phenomena or relationships within it, the need for 
categorical data and measurements is greater” (Stake 2010, p. 77). 
 This research does not only focus on previous research on the topic and a fact-check of 
the latest governmental actions; a focus on secondary qualitative data is present as well. These 
specific types of data will be further explained and elaborated in the subsection dealing with 
other forms of data. 
4.2 Theory and research 
The following paragraphs are intended to explain what theories were used for this 
project and how they are connected to the data that were gathered. In particular, two types of 
theories guided the thesis. The first one, at an ontological level, refers to what is considered to 
be a “grand theory”. The latter, closer to the interpretation of data at an epistemological level, 
is a theory of the “middle range” (Bryman, 2012). 
 Regarding epistemology, it must be said that an epistemological issue “concerns the 
question of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline” (Bryman 
2012, p. 27). In the next paragraphs, the criteria on how the state and civil society are 
conceived both in general and in the specific Vietnamese case, and how the relationship 
between them could be studied, will be further investigated. The general approach that guided 
the conceptualization is that of interpretivism. According to this theory, all actors are 
connected by a constant interaction in which they continuously reshape social meanings. 
Everything in the social realm has no meaning per se, but rather is attributed a certain value or 
definition by the actors who use or display it. This meaning basically remains the same until 
social actors replicate the same pattern of behaviour. However, new values and relationships 
are generated when there is a new action from the main actors (Bryman 2012; for an insight 
into the topic see also Foucault, various works). In this case study, for instance, an interplay 
between actors at a macro-level14 has led civil society to ask for more human rights; this, in 
 
14 Between the new position of Vietnam in the international state, i.e., between other states, the 




turn, has forced the state to change the previous normative framework, going to constitutional 
reform in 2013. Nevertheless, this epistemological approach is sometimes criticized because 
of its “third level” of interpretation (Bryman, 2012). In fact, this position is usually connected 
to a qualitative analysis, where the researcher interprets their findings that are already based 
on others’ interpretations of the reality they live in. 
 As for ontological concerns, constructivism was thought to be the best option in line 
with the interpretivist stance. Under a constructionist lens, social order—as a spectrum of 
values that gave sense to reality—is not a fixed entity, but it is in a constant state of change 
instead. This is because relationships between individuals and values are constantly re-shaped 
and negotiated. According to Bryman:  
Constructionism is an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their 
meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social 
phenomena and categories are not produced through social interaction but that they are 
in a constant state of revision. (Bryman 2012, p. 33) 
In research terms, this means that it is important to consider how social reality is the result of 
an ongoing accomplishment between social actors rather than something static, external to 
them. This operation may be done using categories and indicators to “categorize” the specific 
social reality under analysis. In this particular project, this is done through a qualitative 
analysis of the literature. 
4.3 Method - qualitative analysis of the literature 
In accordance with the theoretical approach and the limitations of this thesis, a 
qualitative analysis of the literature on the topic was thought to be the best methodological 
option. As previously stated, however, the final interpretation of data is integrated with a fact-
check and interpretation of the latest major political decisions and social movements/requests.  
Some implications must be considered to better understand this choice. In Vietnam, 
many official documents or records are not translated into English, so it would be difficult to 
work on a large amount of data in this way. Further, many data are unrepresentative for the 
whole country; in fact, there are many differences between the cities and the inland regions. 
For instance, some parameters that measure the new wealth of the middle class are difficult to 
obtain because Vietnam is still largely a cash economy, and the personal income tax-
collection system is in its infancy. Further, eventual primary data analyses have to carefully 





 Nevertheless, qualitative analysis of the literature has its own advantages. In fact, it is 
possible to conduct a secondary analysis of the data, thus allowing the researcher to use data 
that were neglected by the primary investigators; further, new interpretations of the same data 
may be possible, especially in light of new events and considerations that were not included 
before. 
4.4 Premise to the theoretical framework – Ontological conceptualization of civil society 
and the state 
At this point, it is worth looking at how civil society and the state are conceived at a 
higher, ontological level. The reasons behind the adoption of an actors-centred approach will 
then be presented.  
Civil society, and civic organizations as its organizational form of action, are not 
considered as inherently leading to a more liberal form of government. Even though there is 
no doubt about a political change within the Vietnamese Party system, the study has found no 
reliable proof regarding a shift toward a “complete” democratic form of government. Civic 
organizations, in turn, could not be considered ex ante as different, in their nature, from the 
governmental structure. From a top-down perspective, this is because every state could be 
seen as the aggregate form of its citizens and, so, there is a continuous interplay between them 
and the state. At the societal level, people largely share the same culture—hence attitudes, 
beliefs, and practices that are brought forward by the state. The same practices that everyone 
brings in their everyday life in their individual form, are the same values that, in turn, may be 
found in the aggregation of people, and so within communities, groups, and those same civic 
organisations (Szydło & Bukłaho, 2020). Forming a vicious circle, these thus become the 
same principles that justify the centralized form of government that defines the Vietnamese 
polity. In specific, it would be trivial to consider the Vietnamese government as opposed to, 
and founded on, different values than those which regulate civil society. If that were the case, 
it would not be understandable and explainable how the one-Party system may be legitimized 
and sustained by its people. Every form of government, independently from its nature, needs a 
certain minimum level of consensus. If this is lacking, even in dictatorships, the government 
inevitably falls.  
To conclude, it is very unlikely that the political level and the civil society are founded 
on and share different values and ideas. As it is clear from the evidence, people tend to mimic 
the same state hierarchical system in their organizations (Hofstede, 2011); doing so, they are 




within the society. Moreover, such political change is analysed by looking at the nature of the 
relationship between the government and civic organizations with a focus on how such 
relation is facilitated in case problems do occur (Hofstede, 2011).  
Once the concept of civil society is clarified, it is necessary to specify how the second 
element of this thesis—the state—is ontologically conceived. It is important to remember 
again that the thesis aims to study the contextual political change on one hand, and the room 
of maneuver that civic organizations are now given on the other. To do so, an actor-centred 
approach is here a valuable tool because it allows studying the correlations of abstract 
processes on institutions (polity change) by examining their impacts on particular actors, in 
this case on civic organizations (Marks, 1996, p. 34). The state is here considered as only the 
stage, the institutional framework, in which politicians pursue their goals. As human beings, 
politicians share the same zeitgeist or spirit of the time, as the members of civic organizations. 
So, when particular polities are justified according to the concepts of “national interest” or 
“state interest”, it is important to consider them as an abstraction that does not belong to any 
objective reality. Thus, political change may be seen as the result of particular political actors’ 
actions. In this process, they interpret the legal framework they are embedded in whilst they 
are subject to other macro forces, such as the international context. Disentangling the idea of 
authoritative decision-making, for instance, it is possible to approach this process whilst 
distinguishing between political rules and political actors. Whereas rules serve as constraints 
for the political actors, they may also be changed by those actors when they no longer fit the 
surrounding context (Marks, 1996, p. 5). In Vietnam, one practical example about that is the 
changing discourse on the primary function of the law; this shift in mentality finds expression 
in the legislative impasse since 2005 about the Law on Demonstration (Luật Biểu Tình). All 
the debate around the draft of such law, which has not yet been approved, testify to a 
transition in the conception of the law from a regulatory device for social control to rights-
enhancing legislation towards recognition and safeguard of citizens’ right to assemble and 
protest (Wang and Truong, 2020).  
To conclude, whereas the Communist Party could be seen as the principal actor in the 
Vietnamese system, from an actor-centred perspective the Party-state apparatus is the place 
where domestic, local instances and international politics meet. Hence, it just provides the 
context of rules for authoritative decision making and, therefore, it is not an actor in and of 
itself. On the contrary, head political leaders are the ones that collect and merge all the 




4.5 Comparing different approaches 
The three more common approaches in the analysis of the relationship between civil 
society and the political decision-making process are the domains-based approach, the 
structural-functional approach, and the actors-centred approach. Each of them is sustained by 
a different theory(s) and thus each may likely reach different conclusions when faced with the 
same subject of analysis. This is because every analysis is based on different premises, and 
thus considers differently the objects of its investigation and the relations among them. In this 
particular case, civil society and the state may be perceived differently and may be given 
diverse expectations depending on the particular theory; for instance, while the structural-
functional approach reflects the classic view of civil society as leading toward democracy, the 
actors-centred approach limits its focus to the operational features that are displayed by civic 
organizations and the quality of its relationship with the local government (Wischermann, 
2010). The choice of the theory at the basis of the investigation, and the approach to 
organizing the analysis, is hence particularly important because it shapes the method and 
methodology behind the inquiry. Moreover, while a certain methodology leads to how the 
issue is perceived, the resulting method reflects how the analysis is going to be conducted and 
the data elaborated. Likewise, even if it is not possible to discern a priori a sound method 
from a poor one, it is equally true that some methods may bring about inferences that do not 
reflect the reality they aimed at describing. 
The actors-centred approach15differs from the other approaches because it considers 
civil society in a more dynamic view, detaching itself from static conceptualizations based on 
the logic of domain. According to Uphoff and Krishna’s concept of continuum, such 
dynamism is because the subjects of investigation are not conceived as fixed entities, but as a 
mode of interaction (Uphoff and Krishna, 2004). Thus, civic action is seen as the relationship 
between the state and its people, between the latter and the market, and all the values and 
norms that give meaning to these interactions that, in the end, shape culture. In practice, civic 
actors are not considered as such with a “top-down” analysis by scholars who may be 
partially or totally unfamiliar with the local culture; rather, the decision is posed to the actors 
themselves. The focus is thus shifted to what Vietnamese actors call civil society and what, in 
 
15 This approach has been elaborated for the first time by scholars from the Social Science 
Research Centre Berlin, namely Dieter Gosewinkel and Dieter Rucht, Shalini Randeria, Sven 




their opinion, constitutes civic action and motivates them to engage in civic organizations. In 
this regard, further research with such an approach may directly ask civic associations about 
their relationship with the state and other governmental organizations, how they perceive such 
relationships, and how it has been changing over time. 
4.6 Theoretical framework – Middle range theory 
The theory at the basis of the actors-centred approach is an ensemble of analyses from 
different academic fields, here on the specific case of civil society action. The most important 
contributions in this sense are given by Parsons (1971) and Giddens (2013) from a 
sociological perspective, Offe (2000) for a political science view and Habermas (1991) 
regarding the philosophical aspect. All these authors agree to consider every society as 
divisible into sub-systems such as the economy, the state, and the private sphere. Every group 
is equipped with specific means of social coordination that, in turn, help it to coordinate its 
action with others’ and differentiate the nature of the relationship depending on the active 
agent who displays it. As Wischermann states, “[civil society] realizes and manifests itself in 
social interactions which draw boundaries within and without” (Wischermann, 2010, p.10). 
This means that boundaries are placed within the same categories of civil society depending 
on the point of view of the observer and the time the analysis is referring to. Also, edges are 
present outside the civic category to differentiate it from the other values that coordinate the 
categories of 1) the market, based on exchange and money-based transaction, 2) the state, 
founded on political-administrative institutions with power and rule regulating their 
interaction, and 3) family and kinship, based on closeness and personal relations. All of the 
above-mentioned authors agree that every mechanism is present at various degrees in all three 
subsystems, even if there is always a dominant marker (e.g., money in the market sphere, 
power in the state sphere, and civil society action in the third sphere). However, not all 
scholars adhere to the assumption that civil society belongs to the third and private sphere: 
this could be solely reserved for the family, and a fourth sphere could be added to 
accommodate civil society. Thus, considering civic society action as “a specific type of 
interaction which takes place in the public sphere, but also in other spheres” (Wischermann, 
2010, p. 10), reveals the definition of action and interaction given by Gosewinkel and Rucht: 
This action and interaction are founded on respect vis-à-vis the right to exist and the 
room for development of other persons and groups – a right which has its limits at the 
point where others’ rights and collective goods are going to be violated. Such 




based on the advantages of persuasive power that cooperation offers […] Integrative 
and coordinating powers derive from the more or less abstract insight that peaceful 
coexistence and readiness to compromise offer enormous advantages. On the practical 
level such recognition crystallises in procedural rules, i.e., the acceptance of certain 
ways of dealing with others. A sphere of interaction with such rules could be called 
civil society. (Gosewinkel and Rucht, 2004, as cited in Wischermann, 2010, p. 10, 11) 
The central point for every study is thus proving empirical validation about mutual 
recognition behind civil society action. There may be different reasons for the shared 
acceptance of mutual recognition as the foundation of societal action; it could be seen as a 
general commitment to justice and reason, or there may be more faith-based rationales, moral-
related obligations, or others. 
4.7 Group selection and elaboration of data 
The choice of an adequate subject for the analysis has followed a matrix of three 
criteria: type of actor, its differentiation, and its geographical positioning. 
For the first criterion, it was necessary to establish what parameters to follow to 
determine who could be considered suitable for the purposes of the thesis. In this regard, the 
division of society into economic classes was discarded while, considering the scope of the 
project, the best choice was found by focusing on the different levels of commitment toward 
society along with a relation with the state apparatus. Thus, for the reasons and concepts that 
are presented in Chapter 2, civil society members were considered the best candidates: they 
may struggle for a social change—hence act as bearers of certain social values—or they may 
act to maintain a certain status quo. Nevertheless, this division between a more liberal and 
traditional section is present in every society and not identifiable a priori. Thus, even if civic 
actors are generally thought to be liberal value-bearers, eventual replication of the state 
system in the participants’ organization hierarchy and decisional model is not to be 
considered a bias per se (Wischermann, 2016). 
During the interpretation of the data, the other criterion that was considered is strictly 
intertwined with the first and regards the specific division of civic organizations in their 
nature (foundational characteristic) and area of interest. The two criteria together should keep 
an adequate level of representativeness between the study and Vietnamese civil society in 
general. On a more specific level, a closer look at the Vietnamese associational life realm has 
shown at least four main organizational types: 





3. Community based organizations (CBO) / Volunteer groups 
4. Social enterprises 
From this realm, it must be said that all research centres dedicated to the study of socio-
political trends were excluded from the analysis. This is because it is more likely they are 
familiar with this topic and, thus, they may bias the data. Further, both institutes affiliated 
with (or subsections of) local universities and other private or international institutes were 
included in the first category. This latest division was done because it was interesting to see 
eventual differences between those entities that are closer to the state apparatus (universities) 
and those that are not. As in the case of geographical positioning, the hypothesis here was that 
a governmental affiliation should have shown fewer troubles in the relationship with the 
apparatus. For all these categories, a sub-classification can be done regarding their area of 
interest. However, this aspect is comparable to the situation present in most other countries—
there are organizations committed to human rights, environment, gender, entertainment, 
housing, legal support services, labor rights, health, education, economic development, etc. 
 As the last criteria in the selection, geographical positioning could not be overlooked. 
In the interpretation of data, it was necessary to consider the position of the specific 
organization’s headquarters and its main site of action. However, this point was particularly 
important not just for the representativeness of the data, but for answering the research 
questions themselves. It is essential to consider the clear social and political differences 
between the two main North-South regions in the country. As we have seen from other 
research, Hanoi-based organizations tend to be closer to power and, thus, show more 
problems in their relationship with the government (Wischermann, 2003, 2010, 2013).  
4.8 Self-reflexivity      
Especially in studies of a qualitative nature, researcher background can be a challenge. 
In fact, this challenge applies to the whole process of the research project: from the 
formulation of the research questions to how the data is presented and analyzed. Here, two 
aspects are particularly relevant for the researcher: do not have preconceptions and be 
reflexive. Regarding the first point, a more extensive explanation may be found in the 
foreword. The basic idea is that, as a theoretical approach, democracy is not considered here 
to be the final end of political developments nor the best context for economic development 
(Dahl, 2007). There are too many counterexamples or deviant cases not to believe that. So, 




political and social status affects the research (Bryman, 2012, p. 393). In this regard, being 
reflexive also means detaching from the social and cultural background to design the project 
with as few preconceptions as possible, and being open to any possible result, including those 
which go against the initial hypotheses.  
4.9 Summary 
This chapter aimed at explaining what the ontological and epistemological position 
behind the conceptualization of civil society, the state, and the relationship between them is. 
Interpretivism was considered to be the most suitable stance for the first aspect, whereas 
constructivism played a great part in defining the above concepts. The method that was 
chosen to investigate the research questions is a qualitative analysis of the literature, without 
detaching from the current political and social state of affairs.  
The data analysis and interpretation are presented and discussed in the next section of 
the thesis. In this next part, the thesis will move on to its major part, with a critical 




5 Contextual framework - Vietnamese relation with China 
 
This chapter is intended to give a more thorough background of the case study in order 
to fully appreciate the current social and political environment. The discourse is developed 
into two parts, where the first is more focused on the internal decision-making process, and 
the second gives more attention to the external environment that influenced the Vietnamese 
economic and political strategy. 
After a glimpse of Vietnam’s history, the focus will shift to how Vietnam attempted to 
move further away from its conflict years by promoting internal unity through economic 
growth. In this regard, it must be noticed how the Vietnamese strategy for economic 
development is particularly interesting, since it had to avoid both the USSR model on one 
hand, and the Indonesian nightmare on the other. In the first case, the need was felt to avoid a 
great effort, in both the political and economic spheres, that could risk a state collapse. 
However, Vietnamese political leaders were also conscious that just guaranteeing internal 
growth and stability is not a guarantee of legitimacy per se, as was shown by the fall of 
Suharto government of Indonesia in 1998 after the Asian Financial Crisis.  
The second section will give space to the external surroundings Vietnam had to face 
during its reform process. Among others, particularly relevant are the tensions caused by 
China’s rise and the South China Sea Situation.  
Despite the fact that the analysis of this thesis is not entirely focused on these aspects, 
it is important to present them in order to understand in what situation all the reforms at hand 
took place; in particular, what Vietnam had to do was to manage internal frictions without 


























5.1 Historical roots – ethnic resistance from Chinese assimilation 
Vietnam is the land of the việts. The word Vietnam is thus made up of Việt and Nam 
which, together, means the country of the southern việt (Ngọc, 2015, in Botsford et al., 
2015).16 In a multi-ethnic mix, the việt people lived with other groups in a territory that 
stretched from the south of the Yangtze River in present-day China to the northern part of 
present-day Vietnam. Among the many groups of the việt people, those who lived further 
south created a cultural identity in the Red River basin during the Bronze Age, before the 
formation of the Chinese empire. The latter, created in the third century BC, absorbed all the 
ethnic groups of the territories mentioned, but the southern vistas resolutely retained their 
national identity, resisting assimilation despite centuries of Chinese domination followed by 
numerous conquests (Montessoro, 2002). 
 After the second century BC however, the first Vietnamese state was dominated by the 
Chinese empire for nearly a thousand years. The Vietnamese had to wage a constant struggle 
to preserve their Southeast Asian identity and not be “Sinized”. In the 10th century, they 
managed to obtain national independence, preserving it for 900 years until 1880. For over two 
thousand years, the dynamic of acculturation with the dominance of Chinese influence has 
translated into a double movement of repulsion and attraction towards the rich and varied 
culture of the Empire of the “Center”. It was in this way that together with Japan and Korea, 
Vietnam was integrated into the cultural system of East Asia under the strong influence of 
China (Botsford et al., 2015). 
5.2 Political similarities with China – curb to social and political change 
The current Sino-Vietnamese relationship is very complex and has its roots in a long 
history of shared traditions and Vietnam's efforts to adapt to the constraints imposed by its 
great neighbor. Both countries face the variables that result from social modernization and 
great economic thrust, but Vietnam is more vulnerable to them than China because it is a 
smaller country and because its leadership is less united. The first force is in fact the popular 
push for democratization, which has a mainly internal impact, while the second is 
nationalistic enthusiasm, which has an effect above all on foreign policy. 
 
16 It is interesting to draw a parallel with the name Yugoslavia: Jugo (South) and Slavic (country 




The two countries share similar socialist ideologies and rhetoric and are ruled by 
Communist parties with comparable views on internal authority and international relations. 
However, an important difference between Vietnam and China today is that while China's 
central leadership appears cohesive and strong, the Vietnamese leadership appears divided 
and weak. The important positions in the Vietnamese government are distributed by balancing 
representatives of the North and the South: the current general secretary of the Party and the 
president of the National Assembly are from the North, the president and the prime minister 
are from the South. Each of these figures has a political clientele and a personal consensus 
base within the Communist Party: a system of cross-vetoes has developed over the past 
twenty years that prevents a single personality from consolidating their personal power and 
exercising strong leadership (Schuler, 2021). 
This situation has led the Vietnamese Communist Party to lean on the Chinese one, 
from which the former draws inspiration to counter the threats of the global economy and the 
demands for political pluralism. In this situation, fear is a rapid and obvious transition to a 
form of political pluralism that would cause Beijing to meddle in Vietnamese politics. The 
fear is in fact that, if the social and political reforms in Vietnam preceded similar reforms in 
China, Chinese intervention could be risked. To conclude, it can be said that the Ðôi Mới 
favors (like any other capitalist economic growth) individualism, which can erode and destroy 
Vietnamese cultural identity, which is based on collectivism. This does not mean approaching 
the viewpoints of modernization theory because, as previously mentioned, economic growth 
alone is not enough to sustain a transition to a polyarchic form. Be that as it may, Vietnam's 
problem now is to find a way to harmoniously combine Western individualism and traditional 
Eastern collectivism. 
5. 3 The South China Sea dispute 
Since the launch of Ðôi mới in 1986, in order to facilitate economic development, 
Hanoi has placed as its main foreign policy objective the “creation of a favorable international 
environment and facilitating conditions to serve the cause of national construction and 
defense” (Nguyen 2007, p. 42). In the South China Sea (in Vietnam, the East Sea), this 
principle translates into the peaceful resolution of disputes. Vietnam therefore behaves like 
the weaker part in an asymmetrical relationship with China: it tries to defend its national 
interests without compromising good relations with Beijing. The resulting policy is therefore 




In turn, the involvement can be of two types: direct or indirect. In the first place, direct 
involvement consists of bilateral dialogue with Beijing. Hanoi argues that maritime issues 
have become one of the most discussed topics in discussions among leaders during high-level 
visits to China. In addition, the two countries established the Vietnam-China Commission on 
Bilateral Cooperation in 2006 and a network of channels between their respective parties, 
militaries, border provinces, and government agencies that handle maritime affairs, fisheries, 
etc. Vietnam and China also conducted direct negotiations on unresolved disputes: in October 
2011, during the visit of the Communist Party Secretary General Nguyễn Phú Trọng to 
Beijing, the two countries signed the Agreement on Guiding Principles for the Resolution of 
Maritime Issues, in which they undertook the acceleration of demarcation of and cooperation 
regarding the Gulf of Tonkin, and to consolidate cooperation in less sensitive sectors such as 
marine environmental protection, maritime scientific research, search and rescue operations, 
and the prevention of natural disasters (Nhan Dan Online, 2013). 
Some Vietnamese analysts are convinced that, by raising South China Sea disputes in 
high-level debates, these can become an urgent foreign policy priority of Beijing, encouraging 
its leaders to consider the issues in the broader framework of bilateral and regional relations, 
as well as better manage competition between various Chinese interest groups—a major 
source of recent tensions. Such initiatives are also expected to increase mutual trust and 
reduce misunderstandings between the respective interest groups. Secondly, indirect 
involvement manifests itself in the attempt to work with other ASEAN members thus 
involving Beijing in multilateral debates on the South China Sea in order to bring it to 
implement the Declaration of Conduct and, eventually, to draft a new one. This is a central 
point of Vietnam's strategy, which has worked to ensure that the organization maintains a 
minimum of consensus—despite divergent interests and external pressures—at least on the 
protection of freedom of navigation, regional stability, respect for international law, and 
maintaining the centrality of ASEAN in the regional architecture of security and the evolving 
economy (Thủy, 2015). In this regard, Vietnam has been trying to enhance the ASEAN 
engagement with its neighbors Cambodia and Laos in order to curb China’s rising influence. 
This mediation, however, serves a self-interest to preserve Vietnamese national security. 
Hanoi has faced for many years an enduring trust deficit within the ASEAN concert. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam remains committed to ASEAN, as its chairmanship in 2020 
demonstrates (Thu, 2021). 
These two approaches provide Vietnam useful channels for working with China, but 




the indirect involvement, in order to be effective, requires China’s will to respect the common 
will in Southeast Asia. And, in the case of direct involvement, the competition has been 
particularly acute in recent years between the Chinese and Vietnamese coastguards, which are 
placed to protect resources such as fisheries and hydrocarbons; the two countries have not yet 
set up dialogue mechanisms in these areas (Thủy, 2015, in Botsford et al., 2015). 
To conclude, it must be said how Vietnamese foreign policy brings about the 
country’s adoption of a stable, friendly political relationship toward China. This is likely to 
continue to occur despite China’s increasingly aggressive stance in the East Sea. However, 
this kind of diplomacy is a delicate task for the Party, since it has to balance external security 
with internal anti-China sentiments among the Vietnamese population. This operation is 
particularly evident in Vietnam’s adamant effort to balance China with the West (US but now 
EU as well) while not getting too close to either (Knödler, 2021).  
5.4 Summary 
Addressing Chinese assertiveness in Southern waters, by combining involvement with 
balance, is still regarded as the most effective strategy for defending Vietnam’s national 
interests while maintaining a peaceful and non-confrontational relationship with Beijing, in 
order to increase Vietnam’s role in ASEAN and to promote cooperation with other great 
powers. The strategic margin of maneuver in Hanoi has not yet reached its limits, especially 
in two aspects: the use of international law and the deepening of relations with the other 
countries concerned. If the other balancing tools fail to stop China from meddling in 
Vietnamese national interests, Hanoi can seriously play the legal way as a final peaceful card.  
Regarding the internal front, political liberalization is strongly demanded by the 
population and eventually necessary to avoid an economic backlash (Thủy, 2015, in Botsford 
et al., 2015). However, such a shift is not going to occur spontaneously nor in a short time 
frame. The central Party has to carefully look at China during this transition, because of its 




6 Impact of single-Party elections — Opportunity to formulate preference 
 
 This chapter concludes the dissertation on the concept of democracy and 
contextualizes it into Vietnamese circumstances. It specifies how Vietnam also differs from 
neighboring China in its path of social modernization, as feudal dismantling and the struggle 
for independence coincided here. 
Finally, an analysis of political change in this country will focus on the opportunity to 
formulate preferences. In particular, a closer look will be given to the freedom to form and 
join organizations, along with freedom of expression and the right of political leaders to 
compete for support. The chapter closes the thesis with a re-evaluation of the Vietnamese 
political system—a necessary re-evaluation that takes place by separating its path of political 
liberalization from ideological or cultural liberalization. 
6.1 “Democracy” in Vietnam  
To understand the role that the Vietnamese party has had in Vietnamese society, and 
how it is viewed by its citizens, we need to take a look at Vietnam’s struggle for 
independence. The historical analysis of the original functions and struggle of the Party 
makes it easier to understand how the concept of democracy has a different value in this 
region compared to how it is generally understood, and to which we refer to Chapter 2. Since 
this is not the proper place for an examination of this magnitude, which has already been 
analyzed in depth by other scholars, only the main points will be reported here. 
Taking up Moore's thesis on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy (2010), it 
is clear that Vietnam is a very particular case. The peculiar element of its context is that, 
unlike the states analyzed by the historian, Vietnam’s struggle for independence and national 
unification coincided with the dismantling of the feudal class.17 It should also be noted that 
this process took place in a non-industrialized and markedly economically undeveloped 
country. As can be understood, the reactionary spirit towards imperialist politics, but above 
all against the feudal class, did not originate from the peasant masses, from the people; rather, 
 
17 In reality, there is a slight temporal discrepancy dictated by priorities: first a struggle was 
carried out against the French colonialists, and then the feudal dismantling proceeded. After the 
Revolution of August 1945, the representatives of the king’s power, the mandarins, and the 
previous French and Japanese administrations were removed. Only after the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu were the landowners deprived of their privileges on a national scale, at which time the 




there was a dismantling of it from the top. Unlike other states,18 due to the economic structure 
of Vietnam, there was no merchant class capable of joining the political class in the process of 
feudal dismantling. In this transition phase, when a social class with strong economic power 
but irrelevant from the decision-making point of view is formed, an alliance is created with 
the previous political elite in the opposite situation: indeed, endowed with legislative power, 
but without capital. Although Vietnam has a large coastline, there has not been a commercial 
union of ports as in neighboring Japan, for instance. In the Vietnamese case, it was the Party 
that imposed a social and economic reorganization, in a way that was probably more violent 
than what happened in Italy and Japan before the establishment of fascism. 
Analyzing the testimony of General Giap (1968) himself, these two struggles, against 
the imperialist French on the one hand and the landowners on the other, had to proceed in 
parallel due to the particular situation of the time. The reasons that led to the establishment of 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945 were dictated by a special context of necessity 
and urgency,19 a historical unicum that favored the establishment of Marxist-Leninist regimes 
around Vietnam as well.20 
The party, therefore, always justified its goal of liberation and unification through a 
democratic national revolution. Giap (1968) never clarifies what he or the Party means by the 
adjective “democratic”. However, two meanings of the term are recognizable in his writing. 
In the first place, the concept of democracy is placed side by side with that of class, in a 
triangulation between the army, the Party and the peasants, where all are supported by the 
same ideals and are moved to reunify Vietnam for the same reasons. Here the concept of 
democracy therefore indicates the purge of Vietnamese society from the group of landowners 
who, due to their status, cannot fully share the point of view of the peasantry-workers. In this 
sense we can understand the concept of people’s war expressed by Giap (1968)—a war 
 
18 The best-known case is perhaps England; see Moore (2010). 
19 It has been seen in other studies that this is the classic context that is advanced as an excuse 
to delay or stop some reform processes of a social, economic, or political nature. This logic 
applies to all forms of social restructuring; see Peterson (1992). 
20 The most obvious cases are those of the Soviet Union and China. Although all three countries 
pursued similar goals, each did so according to its own peculiarities. China was a semi-feudal 
and semi-colonial state like Vietnam; however, it had a much greater demographic density and 
a more functional bureaucratic system (even though it was already in crisis). The Soviet Union, 




otherwise described as a “democratic national revolution”.21 In this sense, the aim was to 
eliminate what was defined as the “essential social contradiction”, that is, the opposition 
between the whole of the Vietnamese nation to the imperialists and the feudal lords. 
The second meaning of “democracy” in this context is deeply linked to the 
organization of the Vietnamese political-decision-making system. In this sense, the 
(presumed) equal importance of all members and organizational nucleus within the decision-
making pyramid must be highlighted. According to this scheme, it could be said that, while 
the ultimate decisions were scrutinized by the Party, their origin did not have a fixed point, 
since there was continuous feedback between the ground level and the political level. The 
Party, made up of ordinary people, had to continually be attentive and responsive to the needs 
of the people. Such a high level of efficiency in responding to needs came about thanks to a 
great capillarity of cells, through the organization of Party congresses at different levels. In 
this regard, General Giap (1968) argues that: “It is important here to emphasize the need for a 
constant adjustment between the responsibility of the heads at the executive level and the 
leadership of the Party Committee, in accordance with the principles of collective leadership 
and individual responsibility” (p. 129). He continues, “The relationships between cadres and 
combatants, between superiors and inferiors, […] are relationships based on political equality 
and class fraternity” (p. 132). 
Although these terms have decidedly flattered and propaganda-like tones, we 
understand the difference between this concept of democracy, and the one more widespread in 
other parts of the world; while in the West “democracy” assumes the connotations of political 
equality between different social classes, in the Vietnamese context it becomes class equality 
to shape politics. 
6.2 Impact of single-Party elections and legislatures for democratization 
The first aspect that deserves to be analyzed is the degree to which elections affect 
authoritarian stability in the particular case of a democratic transition. The premise that needs 
to be made is that, basically, it is the Party that exercises weak or strong control over the 
Legislative Assembly according to the political situation of the moment, thus ensuring the 
 
21 The party is therefore depoliticized because any political form would lead to a “bourgeois”, 
and subsequently individualistic conceptions, which would distance the Party from responding 





survival or suppression of political proposals based on the party’s political line. In this 
context, when the government wants to settle an issue, it acts directly on the legislative 
agenda. 
In regimes of this type, rather than the one-party Legislative Assembly directly 
legitimizing this transition, it instead uses soft propaganda to hinder this process (Schuler, 
2021). Even if there is no spontaneous movement towards a multi-party system, if a transition 
were to occur, there is evidence that it would be towards democracy (Brownlee 2009; Schuler, 
Gueorguiev, and Cantu, 2013, as cited in Schuler, 2021, p. 199). However, even if the VNA is 
not likely to lead to a form of democracy in the Vietnamese case, its role in political 
liberalization is more complex (Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015, as cited in Schuler, 2021, p. 
200). In fact, political liberalization, unlike democratization, does not require a change of 
regime. The political system can indeed liberalize or deliberalize without making a drastic 
transition to another type of regime. In this situation, for example, the various candidates can 
look for new forms of association and express their points of view more. This phenomenon 
arises from the fact that the greater the division within the party, the greater the space for 
debate. This room of maneuver depends on the stability of the government and is modulated 
directly by the Secretary General according to particular political conditions. When the 
government is going through a crisis, political rhetoric could undergo a tightening within the 
Assembly, reducing the space for discussion. On the contrary, in times of political peace, the 
need to resort to such rhetorical means is diluted. In these political fluctuations, some reforms 
may pass, with the future government facing difficulties in repealing them. In fact, while the 
space for dialogue changes over time, depending on the stability of the government, the 
reforms that are approved by the Legislative Assembly suffer the effect of the detent. It has 
already happened that the Party has introduced control measures to support short-term 
political logic. However, once the political climate changed, these new institutions were not 
dismantled. An example in this sense can be that of the public vote of no confidence, through 
which the Parliament wanted to introduce control over the prime minister (Reuters Staff, 
2013). This phenomenon has specific political reasons. The Party, evidently, has less 
difficulty in maintaining and controlling the institute than dismantling it and suffering the 
insult of public opinion. A similar principle was expressed by Dahl’s second axiom, in which 
the author explained the costs of tolerance towards the opposition. According to this axiom, 
“the likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected costs of 
suppression increases” (Dahl 2007, p. 15). In this positive correlation, “opposition” can be 




So, ultimately, it is clear that a democratic transition is unlikely to be implemented 
through the agenda of the Legislative Assembly, whilst a growing political liberalism can 
arise through the introduction of political reforms. These, even if they originated and aim for 
specific political contexts, are difficult to dismantle due to costs in terms of public opposition. 
6.3 Opportunity to formulate preferences 
As we have seen previously, the level of democracy may be assessed using different 
indicators. These may change names, but all focus on three aspects: the degree to formulate 
preference, the capacity to signify them, and the opportunity to have them weighted equally in 
conduct of government (See Appendix 2). With a specific focus on the first aspect, the current 
state of affairs of different aspects will now be described: the freedom to form and join 
organizations, freedom of expression, the right of political leaders to compete for support, and 
the availability of alternative sources of information. 
6.3.1 Freedom to form and join organizations 
This point is perhaps the most complex and controversial. Freedom of association 
mainly involves three areas: 
1. Labor Unions 
2. Human Rights Organizations 
3. Political Parties 
In the current state of affairs, this freedom is formally guaranteed by the Article 25 of the 
Constitution, which specifies that: 
Citizens have the right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, and the right of 
access to information, the right to assembly, the right to association, and the right to 
demonstrate. The Law shall prescribe the exercise of those rights. (DEA, 2013) 
The last sentence of the above article clearly states that specific laws below the Constitution 
regulate different spheres of associational life.  
 Regarding labor unions, it must be said that, in practice, freedom of association is not 
allowed. Every category of organization is understood within other umbrella organizations.22 
In the labour case, for instance, every association is listed within the Vietnam General 
 
22 The three main ways to register an organisation in Vietnam are: 1) Formal registration 2) 





Confederation of Labour (VGCL). However, the situation drastically changed in January 
2021, when independent worker representative organizations became legal under the Worker 
Representative Organization (WRO) (Buckley, 2021). In the new Labour Code, the WROs 
are referred to as “grassroots worker representative organisations” (tổ chức đại diện người lao 
động tại cơ sở) or as “enterprise-level worker representative organisations” 
(tổ chức đại diện người lao động tại doanh nghiệp) (Bộ luật Lao động 2019, as cited in 
Buckley, 2021, p. 83). These representative organisations are now allowed to engage in 
collective bargaining and organized strikes at the enterprise level. This latter aspect was a 
strong traditional feature of Vietnamese workers as a way to advance better labouring 
conditions. The aspect was so rooted that the state abandoned the traditional labor union 
schema thus creating the WRO. The ultimate goal of these organizations is to reduce the 
number of strikes through a “harmonious labour relation (quan hệ lao động hài hoà) between 
the state and the workers (Buckley, 2021). For some scholars like Bluckley (2021), this is an 
attempt to put working protests in a normative framework, making it easier for the state to 
control such phenomena. In particular, the scholar states that: 
Rather than being a progressive step forward, freedom of association reforms are an 
attempt by capital to reduce labour militancy. Workers have been using effective 
forms of self-organised, wildcat militancy for two decades, which have led to 
significant improvements in terms of wages, conditions and national policy. 
Concurrently, Vietnam’s “hyper-liberal” capitalism is the same neo-liberalism which 
has served to totally undermine independent trade unions in places where they were 
once effective. Because existing forms of resistance have worked in Vietnam, workers 
have not been demanding independent organisations. Rather, such demands have 
come from capital. (Buckley 2021, p. 80) 
With a closer look at the data, it is impressive how well working demands were met during 
strikes, with a success rate over 90 per cent (ILO, 2017, as cited in Buckley, 2021, p. 81). 
These strikes brought significant changes, such as wage rise, minimum wage, and legal 
reforms. However, the same data must be critically considered. I believe these data just 
represent the final stage of the decisional pyramid. It is true that strikes are now allowed, but 
they must be previously approved by the VGCL after passing through a number of lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures. The instances may be thus rejected for a variety of reasons by the 
control organization. So, it would be highly possible that the same VGCL just approves those 
strikes whose demands are already agreed to be granted by the same organization. So, data 




allowed, ignoring all the rejected demands. A weighted analysis in this sense should show a 
much lower percentage of successful strikes. 
So, at a first sight, this normalization of working conditions comes from outside the 
Vietnamese One-Party system. In this sense, liberal political economy pushed the Party 
toward a more comprehensive system. Assuming this premise, it would imply that the same 
mechanism may apply to other spheres of society such as freedom of expression and to 
human rights activists. Also, if it was the case of a detent effect, it is possible to affirm the 
government is orienting itself slightly toward a political change.  
 Regarding the formation of human rights associations, this practice is still prohibited. 
In early 2019, The United Nations Human Rights Council organized the Human Rights Cycle 
III, where Vietnamese delegates attended the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). In the report 
that was issued, it is said that “since the previous review, Viet Nam has made great efforts to 
improve its law, institutions, and policies on human rights, providing a solid framework that 
has yielded encouraging achievements in practice” (Ministry of foreign affairs, 2019, as cited 
in Vietnam Human Rights Report, 2020, p. 5). As it will be described in the next Chapter, 
civil society in Vietnam must be interpreted in the triangulation between the state and the 
market economy. The same discourse helps us to understand how, in the current state off 
affair, it is implausible to foresee a transition toward political pluralism. 
6.3.2 Freedom of expression 
 This is a particularly hot topic in Vietnam. Regarding freedom of press and access to 
information, independent or privately-owned media are still prohibited by the Vietnamese 
government. Strict control is also exerted over radio, television, and printed publications 
(Human Rights Watch, 2019). Freedom of speech is formally guaranteed by the article 25 of 
the 2013 Constitution, which says:  
The citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the 
press, freedom of access to information, and freedom to assemble, form associations 
and hold demonstrations. The exercise of these rights is guaranteed under the law. 
(DEA, 2013) 
However, although a range of human rights is guaranteed by the Constitution, the Criminal 
Code contains numerous provisions that the Government uses to prosecute those people 
whose ideas “go against the Party way”. These operations of conviction are now substantially 
transposed online. In fact, over two-thirds of the Vietnamese population (64 million people) 




social media, Vietnamese people are provided with a platform where they can express their 
opinions and share ideas, an opportunity most Vietnamese had not enjoyed before. While this 
opening to the world has brought greater opportunities to get a variety of information, express 
one’s thought, and exercise human rights, it also provided Vietnamese authorities with an 
efficient means to conduct surveillance over its people’s feelings and, eventually, means to 
target government critics as well.  
From an economic point of view, this greater internet connectivity is due to the 
migration of some companies, such as Yahoo, to Vietnamese soil. This brought a 
considerably high revenue to the disposal of the Vietnamese government.23 However, on the 
other hand, this new situation represented a challenge for the Party, which started in 2006 by 
enforcing a variety of dispositions to curb political activism and dissent online—an example 
being the law on cybersecurity that was passed in June 2018 by Vietnam’s National Assembly 
(Humans Right Watch, 2019). Sometimes additional methods that fall outside the legal 
framework are still used, such as online harassment, intimidation, physical assault and 
prosecution. On October 25th, Facebook signed a document with the Ministry of Information 
and Communications where the company24 will be committed to limiting anti-state posts 
(BBC, 2021).  
 To conclude, the internet and digital media should have been a great chance to 
transform political practices in Vietnam. Until now, the internet and social networks have 
become the battleground where the government continues to reinforce its power and where 
Vietnamese citizens express their dissent. However, despite the above conditions, the internet 
remains a place difficult to control, thus providing digital tools with which to share ideas and 
achieve valuable information: the essential basis of a confrontation with the government and, 
eventually, political change.  
6.3.3 Right of political leaders to compete for support 
 Even on this point, Vietnam does not display much freedom, even if some changes 
occurred during these last years. Self-nominated delegates find structural obstacles in their 
competition against party members. These obstacles are present both in how competitiveness 
 
23 In 2018, Facebook’s income from Viet Nam neared US$1 billion—almost a third of all its 
revenue in Southeast Asia. Google earned US$475 million in Vietnam during the same period, 
primarily based on YouTube advertising (Amnesty International 2021, p. 11). 




is regulated and in the “structure” (Cơ cấu) of the legislature. This is the same structure that 
impedes free and fair elections, due to the five-gate veto system. To understand this point, it is 
important to have a look at the Vietnamese electoral system. 
 Vietnam’s political power structure is organized into three pillars: The Communist 
Party of Vietnam, the government, and the National Assembly. This last institute serves as the 
country's parliament and its duties are the same as its homologue: passing new laws or 
amending existing ones. However, its peculiarity is in its election of the Party's president, the 
prime minister, and the judges of the Supreme Court (Knödler, May 21, 2021). Its 
fundamental role within the system is thus writ clear. The administrative elections follow 
strictly defined guidelines and bring about the appointment of deputies of the National 
Assembly as well as members of the People’s Councils at every level—provincial, district, 
and communal. So, in every voter turnout, people choose candidates both for the local 
People’s Councils and for deputies of the National Assembly.25 These votes are then 
transformed into counting towards the nominee of the Party's members (Knödler, May 21, 
2021).  
Vietnamese elections have been held every five years since the reunification of the 
two regions in 1976. The country has a bloc voting system in which each district is assigned 
two or three seats according to different criteria and in which voters can express as many 
preferences as their district has seats. Competition is assured by law, because each district 
must have two more candidates than seats available.26 Political competitiveness is generally 
regulated by the 2015 Election Law whilst specific important details are decided by the 
Central Election Commission27 (Hội đồng bầu cử Quốc gia) and provincial election boards 
(Schuler, 2021). It is here that both the number of candidates and who exactly appears on the 
ballot are decided. Technically, this number depends on the population count and on the level 
of the voting—that is, whether elections are held at the provincial, district, or communal level 
and is from time to time decided by the Central Election Commission. Here, a principle of 
competitiveness is given by the fact that the above Commission sends candidates nominated 
by central institutions to compete against those candidates that are provincially nominated. 
 
25 It is interesting how, Unlike in most other countries, voters do not mark the candidate they 
want to vote for, but rather cross out the candidates they do not want to vote for. 
26 See paragraph 6 of Article 57 of the 2015 Election Law. On election of deputies to the 
National Assembly and People’s Councils in the bibliography. 




However, this procedure is flawed because the VNASC, which is juridically superior to the 
Election Commission, is entitled by the law to decide how many delegates each province 
receives. Even if the population is the main guideline, the Standing Committee grants some 
provinces more delegates than others. Considering that the Election Law also fixes the 
minimum number of delegates at six, it must be said that this brings forth an evident 
underrepresentation of some provinces (Schuler, 2021). Malapportionment is generated in the 
nomination of the provincial leader representative in the CPV Central Committee, but it is 
then also replicated in the Party institutions as well. So, despite the fact that every province is 
autonomously divided into districts and there are more candidates than seats available, this is 
only a nominally “competitive” electoral system. This is because the Electoral Law is 
continuously rewritten by the VNASC according to the specific governmental goals for the 
upcoming elections.28 
The other point that hinders candidates from competing is their independence. In terms 
of representation, pluralism is broadened by the presence of two types of delegates: non-Party 
members and self-nominees. The latter may be either Party members or non-Party members. 
There is also a residual category of candidates who are both non-Party and non-self-nominees. 
These are those who are chosen by organizations under the Fatherland Front. In the end, it is 
the VNA, under the supervision of the VNASC, that is entitled to this appointment (Schuler, 
2021). Both kinds of delegates are necessary for giving the National Assembly a veneer of 
credibility. In this framework, self-nominees are essential for the democratic rhetoric, 
according to which anyone could become a delegate, thus increasing the degree of choice 
(representativeness) of voters. As the former VNA Office vice-chair Nguyen Sy Dung said, 
“Democracy not only depends on the percentage of self-nominees elected, but also depends 
more on the ability to choose. If there are more self-nominees then voters will have the more 
opportunity to choose” (Chau, 2016, as cited in Schuler, 2021, p. 53). Even if this discourse 
may be true in general terms, it finds strong and exponential difficulties in the election 
process. In the 2021 election, out of the 499 elected officials, only four were self-nominees 
and just 14 were non-Party members29. The latter represent just 2.8% of the total number of 
 
28 The law was amended or rewritten in 1980, 1992, 1997, 2001, and 2015 (Schuler 2021, p. 
51). 
29 It is worth noting how self-nominees are non-Party members as well. So, of the 14 total non-
Party members that were elected, 4 were self-nominees and 10 were other candidates advanced 





candidates, whereas self-nominees count for 0.80%. Both figures show a dramatic drop from 
2016, in which self-nominees represented 5% of candidates, and the number of non-Party 
members was 21. However, it is more impressive to look at how non-party or self-nominated 
members are “purged” during the election process (The Vietnamese Magazine, June 14, 2021; 
IFES, May 23, 2021).  
Since the governmental and other important institutions’ members are drawn from the 
centrally nominated candidates, it is extremely important for the Party to control this vetting 
process. The entire procedure of selection is divided into five steps (See Appendix 4). The 
first negotiation (hiệp thương) regards the incoming structure of the VNA itself. It is the 
VNASC which decides the apportionment of the 500 seats into different quotas (Schuler, 
2021).30 So, the first negotiation results in a list of various demographic groups and 
organizations that will be presented.31 Also, in a matrix, the same VNASC decides in which 
composition these quotas should be partitioned between the Fatherland Front, the 
government, and the local Party apparatus. It is extremely important to notice how there is no 
guideline of this latter point in the Election Law; the allocation is extremely biased in favour 
of the Party. If we overlap what is stated in the Election Law with the VNASC partitioning, 
non-party members and self-nominees are extremely disadvantaged. Article 89 of the Election 
Law says that 10% of the total seats are allocated to non-party members. However, this 
situation represents only what they can achieve in theory (On election of Deputies [...], 2015). 
As it is described above, in the 2021 election, they accounted for just 2.8%.  
In the second stage of the negotiation, once positions are allocated, the various 
organizations (central, provincial, district, and communal) nominate individual candidates for 
VNA positions. In order to have political competitiveness, the number of candidates must be 
higher than the equivalent seats. It is at this stage of the process that self-nominees are 
allowed to submit their applications to run for elections. 
 After the nomination of candidates in the previous step, the third and fourth gates are 
devoted to their actual selection. In every meeting the qualifications (tiêu chuẩn) and  
 
 
30For a more detailed analysis of the data, see: Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2021, May 25). 
31At least 18% of total official National Assembly candidates are ethnic minorities (Article 8, 
Par. 2); 35% of total official National Assembly candidates are women (Article 8, Par. 3). 10% 
vacancies out of total National Assembly deputies elected at the early term (Article 89, Par. 1) 





Self-nominated candidates in the VNA 
 
Sources: Radio Free Asia 2021, May 22; Schuler, 2021; The Star 2021, June 11; 
VietnamNews 2021, March 20. 
 
Table 3 
Matrix of possible candidates’ position 
 
 Self-nominated Non-self-nominated 
Party member Candidates advanced by the 
Party both for running the 
election and for challenging 
against non- Part self-
nominated candidates 
Candidates directly proposed 
and sustained by the Party 
Non-Party member Independent candidates not 
affiliated with the Party nor 
with other umbrella 
organizations 
Candidates nominated by 
those organizations linked to 
the Fatherland Front (FF) or 
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competences of the candidate are assessed, and only those who meet the criteria are voted for. 
Here, non-Party members in general and self-nominees must participate in a meeting with 
neighborhood voters. This is the stage where many independent applicants are removed from 
consideration, as it is left to the Party to decide whom to invite to these meetings. So, the 
Party may exert pressure on independent candidates through the selection of attendees to the 
meeting, who usually are members of mass organizations like the Fatherland Front. Results 
show how members of mass organizations, and the party are more likely to be invited and the 
meetings compared to unaffiliated (See Table 2.1 and 2.1 in Schuler 2021, p. 57).  
 During the last and fifth gate, the third negotiation takes place. Here, the Fatherland 
Front engages a new assessment of what emerged from the meetings with coworkers for the 
centrally nominated candidates and with voters from the neighborhood for the self-nominees. 
The result is a provisional list of candidates for the elections that is sent to the Central 
Election Commission. This second stage serves just as a double-check prior to again sending 
the list of candidates to the provinces for the official ballot (Schuler, 2021). 
6.3.3.1 Further reflections on the Vietnamese political system. A careful look at 
Vietnamese elections shows how this system has profound contradictions from a polyarchical 
point of view. However, several considerations must be done prior to leaving the reader to 
conclusions.  
First of all, VNA’s elections just represent a predictable result after the Party congress 
at the beginning of the year. Once the political line is decided after Party members are elected, 
there is not great room for maneuver for the following parliamentary elections. This is 
particularly evident at the poles of the vetting process. Here, the upcoming structure of the 
VNA is partitioned, leaving little space to self-nominees during the first negotiation, and a 
final “sifting” is made by the Central Committee before sending the final list of candidates for 
the ballots. It is especially in these phases that candidates have no voice in the selection 
procedure. Everything is commissioned to institutions close to the central Party such as the 
VNASC, which justify their preferences as “the best choice for the state”. So, it is true that all 
these mechanisms are made to preserve the Party’s privileges.  
However, it must be recognized how the same system seeks to maintain a high level of 
representation of the Vietnamese population. This is done on two fronts. First of all, it is 
peculiar to see provincially named candidates concurrently listed on ballots along with 
centrally proposed candidates. This is intentionally made to respect regionalism without 
losing the central grip, thus avoiding a two-tiered society. Further, for the same principle, 




needs at parliament. Secondly, although there are no official quotas, there is great opportunity 
for minorities to be represented. Every year the percentage of seats held by women is around 
35%,32 whilst ethnic minorities approximately comprise at least 18%. It is thus discernible 
that a matrix of social interests receives considerable consideration. 
6.4 Summary 
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that anomalies exist within the Vietnamese 
system. However, a vision detached from the democratic model allows us to see positive 
elements. To have a more neutral view, therefore, we should separate the concept of political 
liberalization previously expressed from what could be defined as an “ideological 
liberalization” process. The ideological rigidity of the Party is aimed solely at the preservation 
of its structure—like any political system, polyarchic or not. This is coherent with the 
foreword of this thesis. All the elements that hinder the free expression of civil society must 
therefore be interpreted in this sense: as an attempt to stifle any form of political 
delegitimization. The fact that this control has only a political nature can be seen from the 
support of requests that apparently seem irreconcilable with an authoritarian regime; requests 
from the same civil society that are approved or tolerated by the Party, such as those 
regarding the environment or human rights.33   
 
32 This data is quite impressive, considering that the global average percentage of women in the 
Parliament is just 24%. In Asia, there is a dramatic drop, where it is registered as 19%. Italy for 
instance, which has quotas for women in the Parliament, registered 36% in 2019 (UN Women, 
2020). 
33  A clear example of those demands which at first sight seem incompatible with an 




7 Why Vietnam is not a full polyarchy — Some political predictions 
 
This chapter is intended to give a final overview to what was discussed in the previous 
chapters. In the first part, the difference between the concepts of polyarchy and pluralism are 
clarified. Contrary to commonly thought, the two terms, despite being correlated, do not 
indicate the same phenomenon. Polyarchy is then considered in relation to the Vietnamese 
political system. In the second part, it is again explained why and in what ways the 
Communist Party of Vietnam has legitimized civil society, and what role it has in the process 
of political liberalization. The chapter then concludes with a prediction of future trends in 
civil society and government behaviour. 
7.1 Pluralism and Polyarchy 
In order to understand its differences and points of contact with that of pluralism, and 
how Vietnam  may be considered in relation to them, let us first revisit what “polyarchy” is, 
exactly. The concept of polyarchy was systematized for the first time by Dahl and Lindblom 
as a process toward the ideal form of democracy (Dahl, 1984). For Dahl, democracy has 
never been fully achieved and represents an unattainable form of government. In addition, 
polyarchy may also be analyzed as a set of institutions: as a type of regime, as a product of 
democratizing nation-states, as a necessity for the democratic process, as a system of control 
by competition, and as a system of rights. 
On the other hand, the concept of pluralism is essential to explain the social and 
political changes after the transition in scale from the city-state to nation-state level. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the city-state is the stage where democracy found its highest form of 
development. On the contrary, the latter and new paradigm fully realized itself with the 
Industrial Revolution, when industries started to require ever more skilled labour. This, in 
turn, brought a social differentiation into organizations, associations, clubs etc—all 
aggregates of people with the same interests and requests. It was hence this situation that 
brought forth a shift from a monistic form of democracy toward a pluralist one. In this regard, 
Dahl (1984) wrote that “polyarchy requires a considerable degree of social pluralism — that 
is, a diversity of social organization with a large measure of autonomy with respect to one 
another” (p. 232). So, the expansion of social interests broke down the previous typical local 
unit of the city-state, paving the way from a fairly homogeneous society in race, ethnicity, 




All things considered, it could be affirmed that Vietnam is still anchored to the city-
state model in a sense. The ideal of a common good, typical of the city-state perspective, has 
always been at the center of Vietnamese political activity. In a Marxist-Leninist paradigm, 
this ideal is particularly strong, due to the state’s pervasiveness into people’s lives. It is more 
difficult then for the Vietnamese Party to accept diversities that may tend to prevent citizens 
from perceiving or pursuing common interests, thus weakening social cohesion and political 
consensus (Dahl, 1984). The presence of recognized subgroups would lead them to advance 
their particular interests by organizing themselves into political associations. At present, this 
is hardly possible in Vietnam, since the Party exerts control on the VNA to preserve its 
power. Nevertheless, despite the fact that political pluralism is not going to be adopted, social 
pluralism is present. As it is discussed in the thesis, economic reforms gave birth to evident 
social changes. Among these novelties, there was a process of relaxation of controls toward 
civil society. It was the symbiosis of a traditional communist model and a market economy 
that created the space for a civil society class restoration (Bui, 2013). In these conditions, the 
liberal market is responsible for civil society’s elevation from the status of totally ruled by the 
Party-state, to that of “tolerated”, “endorsed”, and then finally recognized by it. Nevertheless, 
this class not only served to sustain economic growth, but helped the central government to 
fill an administrative gap, thus also playing a role in the governance network. In other terms, 
the state organized the class’ presence while still looking at it with suspicion, thus embracing 
the dual challenge of stirring the market economy while framing civil society’s push toward 
political and social liberalization. In this sense, the government has found it useful to take 
advantage of the various roles civil society performs for societal control; for example, by 
organizing it into specific organizations (Bui, 2013). Nonetheless, with time, civil society 
gained more space and autonomy, having now the potential to run beyond the government’s 
direct and capillary control. 
With these considerations in mind, it could be hypothesized that Vietnam’s late 
economic development and its historic predominantly commercial or agricultural economy 
may have retarded the process of social inclusion in pluralist terms. Just as well, a second 
hypothesis could be that the ideal of a common good, a communion between the Party and the 
citizenry, is much stronger than society’s general trend towards fragmentation. This need to 
focus on a nation-shared common good is a stimulus to impede centrifugal, disruptive forces. 






7.2 Mobilizing and complementary role of civil society 
As aforementioned, it is demonstrable how the prominent role of certain groups of 
civil society is to counterbalance state power. Civic organizations represent the best way 
through which citizens can cooperatively and collectively express their needs. However, it is 
also true that this mobilizing role is certainly more difficult in single-party systems. In this 
regard, there is evidence on how the proliferation of NGOs in Vietnam, after the economic 
reforms, failed to mobilize civil society as a whole because of its close ties with the state as 
well as its donor-driven and urban-based characteristics (Gray, 1999, as cited in Nguyen, 
2021, p.113). It is important to note here how civil society may bring political liberalization 
not necessarily through direct confrontation. For instance, “civil society can act as the 
collective effort to supervise the state’s actions and protect vulnerable groups rather than as a 
source of regime-change movements” (Nguyen 2021, p. 113). When it really assumes the 
form of collective will, it can benefit from political weakness putting pressure for a reversal of 
unpopular decisions. This increasing effort that civil society exerts towards advancing 
proposals has led the Party to list it “as one of 27 ‘dangerous tendencies’ that deteriorate the 
integrity of Party members and threaten the regime’s existence” (CPV, 2016, as cited in 
Nguye, 2021, p. 114). This fear of the central apparatus indirectly demarcates the more 
prominent status that what we can call an “active society” is striving to achieve. In this sense, 
if civil society is considered as an independent actor between the state and the market, then 
the Party’s statement is fully reasonable. 
7.3 Summary 
This Chapter showed how Vietnam cannot be considered a polyarchy in a broader 
sense. Nevertheless, pluralism is present in the relations between the central government and 
civic associations. These, in turn, have proven how it is possible to start a political 
liberalization process without a direct confrontation with the Party. In fact, there is evidence 
of reversals of unpopular policy decisions. When civil society does not suffice for these 
scopes, grassroot activism further spurs on society in general.  
To conclude, it is highly unlikely that civil society will bring political pluralism in the 
foreseeable future. However, its constant and evident effort, is not only preventing the 
government from making arbitrary decisions, but will also  probably lead to a recognition and 







 This thesis aimed at explaining which factors may account for political change in 
Vietnam, using the concept of polyarchy as an analytical lens. This approach guided the 
analysis on Vietnamese people’s capacity to formulate preferences, with a focus on the 
institutional guarantees that should be present in every government in order to approach the 
idealistic democracy. In this regard, it is demonstrable how the Vietnamese government is not 
going to display a more polyarchical form of government in the short-term. This is due to 
several factors. On the external front, the adoption of a multi-party, or a more “politically 
liberalized” system, may create friction with Vietnam’s neighbor: China. It would be difficult 
for Beijing to publicly justify an eventual Vietnamese transition toward another political 
model from a government that, on the whole, testifies to a strong social and economic 
development. Internally, political change in the form of “justice”, “civilization”, and 
“democratization” remains a sensitive debate since it is feared that it will facilitate political 
pluralism, thus threatening the stability of Vietnamese one-Party apparatus. 
It was then shown how there is evidence that the Vietnamese Assembly is not pushing 
for political change. However, once certain institutions are approved (such as the veto 
system), their removal by the party is very unlikely. This is perhaps the greatest element that 
may help the government to move away from structural inertia. It is presently unclear for how 
long economic development will sustain social stability. There is the risk that an eventual 
economic bottleneck brings a governmental legitimization, as was shown by the fall of 
Suharto government of Indonesia in 1998 after the Asian Financial Crisis. One way to avoid 
this phenomenon in Vietnam is for the Party to abandon its fixation with the present model 
and its strict ideologies about the economy and state-society relations. This approach will no 
longer help in generating the flexibility needed to modernize institutions and economic 
structures. 
To conclude, real progress can be made through a consensus basis where a plurality of 
interests is recognized and evolves from a productive dialogue. This would be a valid strategy 
towards the creation of a stabilizing force based on shared interests rather than fixed 
ideologies that fulfill self-serving interests. Resistance concerning the separation of powers, 
civil society, and political pluralism should be debated in an open and sympathetic form, 
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 Types of Vietnamese Organizations included in category. 
 





Middle class defined by the level of income 
 
Indicator Formula 
1. Distance from the median 
a. Two-thirds and twice the national medians, thus from 
67 to 200 percent of median income (Pew Review 
Center, 2015) 
 
b. Income band of 50 to 150 percent around the median 
(Krueger, 2012) 
c. 75 to 125 percent around the median (Birdsall et al., 
2000) 
2. Range of the distribution 
a. Three quintiles measure (in the middle) (Easterly, 
2001) 
 b. Two quintiles measure 
 
c. Second -and third- income quintiles (Reeves & Busette, 
2019) 
 d. Third and fourth quintiles (Alesina & Perotti, 1994) 
3. Distance from poverty a. 150 percent of the poverty level (Rose, 2016) 
 
b. 300 percent of the poverty level (Sawhill & Haskins, 
2009) 
4. Absolute purchasing 
power 
a. Income between $11 an $100 daily per person (2011) - 
widespread measure 
 b. $50 daily expenditure per person (2005) (Kharas, 2018) 
 
c. Daily expenditure between $2 and $10 in developing 
countries (2005) (Banerjee & Duflo, 2008) 






Appendix 3  
Dahl’s table — Some Requirements for a Democracy among a Large Number of People 
 
For the opportunity to: The following institutional guarantees are 
required: 
I. Formulate preferences 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 
5. Alternative sources of information 
II.        Signify preferences 1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
III. Have preferences weighted 
equally in conduct of 
government 
1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. Right of political leaders to compete for support 
5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend 
on votes and other expressions of preference 
 





The “five gates” system of vetting 
 
Gate 1 — First Negotiation At this stage the 500 hundred seats are 
partitioned into quotas — Non-Party 
members are marginalized 
Gate 2— Second Negotiation Once the structure is set, organizations 
nominate candidates (more candidates than 
available seats) and self-nominees submit 
their applications 
Gate 3 and 4 — Meeting with constituents 
and with coworkers 
Candidates’ qualifications are assessed by 
their coworkers for Party members and by 
the neighborhood for self-nominees 
Gate 5 — Third Negotiation The Fatherland Front evaluates the 
provisional list of candidates and expresses 
its opinion to the Central Election 
Commission. The CEC sends the final and 
approved version to the provinces for the 
ballot.  
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